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Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) caused by multi-drug resistant organisms 
(MDRO) are an important patient safety concern resulting in a substantial financial and clinical 
burden. This dissertation aims to contribute to the evidence base on institutional and patient level 
factors that predict multi-drug resistant infections in the hospital setting. In the first chapter, I 
review the evidence base on patient-level risk factors for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) bloodstream infections (BSI), system-level factors associated with 
implementation of infection control policies and MDRO rates, and the current knowledge on the 
use of infection control policies on the national level. In the second chapter, I use data from a 
national cross-sectional study to describe the range of MDRO screening and infection control 
policies in U.S. hospitals and identify predictors of their presence and implementation. In the 
third chapter, using data from a cross-sectional study of California hospitals, I assess the 
association between the presence and implementation of infection control policies for MDRO 
infections and rates of BSI caused by MRSA or vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus and 
infections caused by Clostridium difficile. Next, I identify risk factors for healthcare-associated 
MRSA BSI in a nested case control study using two sets of controls. In the last chapter, I 
conclude by summarizing the findings of these three studies. 
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1.0 Introduction  
 
Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) cause significant morbidity and mortality 
in acute care settings.1 Part of this morbidity and mortality is due to increased resistance 
to antibiotics in HAI.2-4 For these reasons and due to the increased focus on public 
reporting of these infections, the identification, prevention and control of MDRO is a 
major focus of infection prevention and control programs in acute care hospitals. Control 
measures most often utilized by hospitals to reduce MDRO rates include the use of active 
surveillance, isolation and contact precautions, antibiotic stewardship, and cohorting of 
colonized patients. 5 Although research studies have been conducted to explore the 
effectiveness of these different control measures, many of these studies are of poor 
quality and limited to single institutions and/or take place in outbreak settings. 6-7  To 
date, there is paucity of research on the use of these infection control policies at the 
national level and on the association between structural characteristics (e.g., infection 
control staffing, hospital teaching status) and the presence and implementation of these 
policies.8-9 Data on the association between the presence and implementation of these 
policies, structural characteristics and MDRO HAI rates on the national level is also 
lacking. Furthermore, existing studies examining patient-level predictors of MDRO HAI 
are limited by small sample sizes and other methodological issues.  
In this dissertation, I describe the range of policies related to screening for and 
control of MDRO infections, as well as adherence with these policies in intensive care 
units (ICU) across the nation using data from a national cross-sectional study. I identify 






the association between structural characteristics, the presence and implementation of 
screening and infection control policies and MDRO HAI rates in a cross-sectional survey 
of California hospitals. Using a nested case control study, I then identify patient-level risk 
factors for Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bloodstream infections 
(BSI) using two sets of controls.  
1.1 Background and Significance 
In this section, I describe the burden of multidrug resistant HAI in U.S. hospitals. 
I discuss risk factors for MRSA infections in hospitalized patients and then focus 
specifically on risk factors for MRSA BSI, since Aim III of my dissertation (Chapter 4) 
focuses specifically on MRSA BSI. Next, I review the recommended infection control 
policies for reducing MDRO HAI in general in the acute care setting and the evidence 
base on the effectiveness of these interventions, which provides the foundation for my 
first two aims. Finally, I discuss the literature on the actual use of these interventions and 
on the factors that facilitate their use and implementation in acute care hospitals.  
1.2 Multi-drug Resistant Healthcare-Associated Infections as a Significant Public 
Health Concern 
Currently, it is estimated that more than 70% of bacteria that cause HAI are 
resistant to at least one antibiotic that is commonly used in treatment of the infection.2  
MRSA, vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE), extended-spectrum -lactamase 
producing (ESBL) gram negative rods (GNR) such as Klebsiella species and Escherichia 






Although infections due to Clostridium difficile are not considered to be MDRO, 
they result in significant patient burden and are associated with the frequent use of 
antibiotics.13-15 The importance of studying C. difficile is further underscored by the fact 
that several states including California have mandated public reporting of C. difficile 
infections. Therefore, infections due to C. difficile are also examined in this dissertation.  
1.2.1 Morbidity, Mortality and Costs Associated with MRSA Infections in Hospitals 
MRSA has been the focus of much research in the last several decades due to its 
major contribution to the morbidity and mortality in hospitalized patients. Staphylococcus 
aureus can cause serious infections at many body sites including the bloodstream, lung 
and skin and soft tissues. Since its introduction in 1960, methicillin represented a 
breakthrough in the treatment of infection due to S. aureus, however, resistance to 
methicillin was noted within two years of its introduction16 and has increased rapidly 
from 2% in 1974 to 40% in 1997.17, 18 More recent data from the National Healthcare 
Safety Network show that MRSA currently represents 56% of all S. aureus clinical 
isolates.19 The overall MRSA prevalence rate in U.S. hospitals in 2006 was 46.3 per 1000 
patients including an infection rate of 34 per 1000 patients and a colonization rate of 12 
per 1000 patients as measured by a MRSA prevalence survey.20 Traditionally, MRSA 
infections have occurred primarily in hospitals and other healthcare facilities21 where 
transmission of MRSA is driven primarily by antibiotic selection pressures and facilitated 
by inadequate infection control processes.22 However, in the last fifteen years, there has 
been an emergence of MRSA infections in community settings among patients without 






Several studies have investigated the attributable morbidity, mortality and cost of 
methicillin resistance in HAI.24-27 A recent study conducted by Filice and colleagues in 
Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals showed that resistance to methicillin in S. aureus was 
independently associated with higher costs due to prolonged hospitalization resulting in 
additional laboratory and imaging tests, as well as increased number of invasive 
procedures provided to the MRSA infected patients. In addition, patients with MRSA 
infections as compared with methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) 
infections were much more likely to die.24   
Bloodstream infections are commonly due to Staphylococcus aureus.28 It is 
estimated that approximately one-third of patients with BSI caused by S. aureus develop 
local complications or distant septic metastases.28 These infections are even more 
complicated when the S. aureus strain is resistant to methicillin or other semi-synthetic 
penicillins. Cosgrove et al. conducted a cohort study to specifically examine the impact 
of MRSA BSI as compared to MSSA BSI and estimated a median attributable length of 
stay of 2 days and a median attributable hospital charge of $6,016.30 This same group of 
researchers conducted a meta-analysis to compare the mortality rate of MRSA BSI with 
MSSA BSI and showed a pooled odds ratio (OR) for mortality of 1.93 after controlling 
for age, severity of illness and other confounders.31 The finding of increased mortality in 
patients with MRSA BSI as compared with MSSA BSI has been shown in other 
studies.32-34 Differences in morbidity and mortality due to these two infections are posited 
to be the result of variations in virulence of the causative strains, vulnerabilities of the 







One of the most common causes of BSI infections in hospitals after S. aureus is 
enterococcal species.35 In the past two decades, resistance to vancomycin in clinical 
enterococcal isolates has been observed.36 A recent meta-analysis of studies examining 
the attributable mortality associated with vancomycin resistant versus susceptible BSI 
showed that after controlling for severity of illness, patients with VRE BSI were more 
likely to die than patients with enterococcal BSI susceptible to vancomycin (pooled OR = 
2.52, 95% CI = 1.9 – 3.4).37   
1.3. Risk Factors for MRSA Colonization or Infection  
Many researchers have investigated the risk factors associated with MRSA 
infections in hospitalized patients.38-40 For example, Graffunder & Venezia conducted a 
case control study of 121 patients infected with MRSA compared with 123 patients 
infected with MSSA. Multivariate analysis identified levofloxacin, macrolides, previous 
hospitalization, enteral feeding, surgery and length of stay before culture as 
independently associated with MRSA infection.39 In a study of U.S. veterans, McCarthy 
et al. described the risk factors associated with methicillin resistance among S. aureus 
infections at different anatomic sites. The adjusted odds ratios for methicillin resistance 
were higher among infections that occurred among patients who had a prior history of 
MRSA infection and resided in a long term care facility in the previous 12 months but 
were lower for infections that occurred among patients who had undergone a biopsy 
procedure in the past 12 months. The researchers also performed a subset analysis of BSI 
cases, which showed that the odds of resistance were highest in patients with chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), with a central venous catheter or with 






Several have attempted to assess risk factors for surgical site infections (SSI) 
caused by MRSA.41-43 Chen et al. identified poor functional status as an independent 
predictor of SSI due to MRSA in older adults.42 The researchers compared two sets of 
controls - 64 patients with MSSA SSI and 167 patients without SSI - with 84 patients 
with SSI due to MRSA, allowing the researchers to potentially differentiate between risk 
factors for MRSA SSI and SSI due to S. aureus in general. In this case the risk factors 
were the same. Using two separate multivariate models, the researchers showed that 
requiring assistance in three or more activities of daily living, Charlson comorbidity 
index and wound class were independently associated with MRSA BSI using both 
controls groups.  
Research shows that S. aureus carriage in the anterior nares plays an important 
role in the pathogenesis of S. aureus infection.44 Numerous studies have shown that 
patients colonized with S. aureus are at increased risk of infection, underscoring the 
importance of S. aureus carriage as an endogenous source of infection.45-47 For example, 
Pujol et al. showed that nasal carriage of S. aureus places patients at higher risk for 
developing S. aureus infections. Furthermore, the researchers showed that MRSA 
colonization is a stronger predictor of BSI due to S. aureus  than MSSA colonization.47 A 
study conducted by Honda and colleagues showed a 2.5 to 4.7 fold increased risk of ICU-
acquired S. aureus infections for those patients colonized with MSSA and MRSA, 
respectively, as compared to non-colonized patients.48 These differences in infection rates 
may be due to differences in severity of illness between the two groups since patients 






hospitalizations and increased severity of illness45 or due to a higher burden of bacteria at 
colonized sites or differences in virulence factors.49  
Several studies have identified age as an independent predictor of BSI infection 
caused by S. aureus.50,51 Additionally, elderly patients have higher incidence of MRSA 
colonization, increased utilization of catheters and other invasive devices and are less 
likely to acquire MRSA BSI through intravenous drug use.52,53 Prior use of antimicrobial 
drugs has shown to be a strong risk factor for MDRO colonization and infection in 
several studies39.54 regardless of the agent used.47, 55 Longer length of stay is a well-
known factor for antibiotic resistance and may represent chronic illness and increased 
opportunity for colonization with MDRO.39 Ventilator dependency or enteral feeding, 
which have been identified as risk factors for MRSA HAI, may represent greater severity 
of illness in the MRSA infected patients. These differences in risk of infection underscore 
the need for carefully chosen comparison groups when studying infections, perhaps 
necessitating the use of matching procedures.  
1.3.1. Patient-level Risk Factors for MRSA BSI 
Due to the fact that MRSA BSI is a major contributor to the morbidity and 
mortality of hospitalized patients, it is important to identify risk factors that place patients 
at risk of developing this infection. Knowledge of the modifiable risk factors for MRSA 
BSI can help to identify patients at risk and can help hospitals institute appropriate 
infection control policies. Although other types of antibiotic resistant HAI such as VRE 
BSI are also important contributors to morbidity and mortality in hospitalized patients, 
this section and Aim III of this dissertation will focus specifically on BSI due to MRSA 






acquisition of HAI can be defined as intrinsic or extrinsic to the patient. Risk factors that 
are intrinsic to the patient are related to inherent characteristics of the patients such as 
age, sex and severity of illness and the patient’s exposures before hospitalization. On the 
other hand, extrinsic factors are related to the procedures and therapies that the patient 
undergoes during the admission, as well as the structure and processes of care provided.56  
Several case-control studies have attempted to identify predictors of MRSA BSI 
in hospitals. In a study conducted by Romero-Vivas and colleagues in a Spanish hospital, 
the researchers prospectively studied all cases of S. aureus BSI that occurred during a 
four-year outbreak of MRSA and compared the clinical characteristics and mortality rates 
of patients with nosocomial MRSA (n = 84) and MSSA (n=100) BSI. The researchers 
found that patients with MRSA BSI were more likely to be older, have prolonged 
hospitalization, prior antimicrobial therapy, urinary catheterization, nasogastric tube 
placement and prior surgery.57 In a similar study, Libert and colleagues identified not 
living at home, prior antibiotic exposure, insulin-requiring diabetes and nosocomial BSI 
as the independent risk factors for MRSA BSI.58 Furthermore, they found that 
nosocomial S. aureus  BSI occurring more than 12.5 days after admission was more 
likely to be resistant to methicillin. Recent hospital admission and assisted living were 
also identified as independent predictors of MRSA BSI in a small study conducted in a 
single hospital in Seattle.59 Blot et al. investigated the differences between patients with 
BSI due to methicillin-susceptible and resistant S. aureus in ICU patients and noted that 
patients with MRSA BSI had more acute renal failure and hemodynamic instability than 
patients with MSSA BSI, as well as longer ICU stay and ventilator dependency.32 All of 






Bakowski and colleagues conducted a case control study in a Brazilian hospital 
comparing 60 patients with MRSA BSI to 240 patients with no infection.60 The 
independent predictors of MRSA BSI in this study were severity of illness indicators and 
the use of central venous catheters. The researchers chose an uninfected control group 
instead of a control group with methicillin-susceptible infections because they aimed to 
isolate and identify risk factors for BSI and not risk factors for methicillin resistance. In 
this study, the researchers randomly selected controls that were hospitalized on the same 
day or immediately after the results of the blood cultures for the cases were available. 
However, the researchers observed large differences in disease severity between the cases 
and controls, which masked other risk factors for infection. In order to evaluate the 
importance of control group selection in studies assessing the association between use of 
antibiotics and MRSA BSI, Ernst et al utilized two sets of controls: one group with 
MSSA BSI and another group without BSI.61 The researchers hypothesized that using 
controls with MSSA BSI may overestimate the association between antibiotic use and 
MSSA BSI since prior use of antibiotics such as methicillin is likely to prevent infection 
with strains of bacteria that are susceptible to the particular antibiotic.62 Indeed, the 
researchers observed a significant association between exposure to antibiotics and 
infections with MRSA BSI when compared with MSSA BSI controls but not when the 
non-infected control group was utilized. One of the major limitations of this study was 
the fact that the researchers matched cases and controls on age, gender, time at risk and 
hospital ward but did not utilize statistical methods appropriate for matched data. Since 
matching in a case control study introduced selection bias, proper control in the analysis 






Researchers have also utilized the cohort design to identify risk factors for MRSA 
BSI. For example, Lodise et al. aimed to identify patients at risk for developing MRSA 
BSI at a trauma center.55 The authors identified 494 cases of S. aureus BSI, only 45% of 
which were hospital onset. The majority of hospital onset S. aureus  BSI were resistant to 
methicillin (69%), as opposed to community onset BSI (22%). The independent risk 
factors for MRSA BSI identified in this study were prior antibiotic exposure, hospital 
onset, history of hospitalization and presence of decubitus ulcers. Bader conducted a 
retrospective cohort study to identify predictors of 7-day mortality associated with S. 
aureus BSI in a cohort of older adults with this infection. In a secondary analysis, the 
author also identified previous hospitalization, residence in a long term care facility and 
altered mental status at the onset of BSI as independent predictors of MRSA BSI.63  
A population based study of methicillin resistance in S. aureus  BSI in Canada 
demonstrated a dramatic increase in cases of MRSA BSI and a steady rate of nosocomial 
and community acquired MSSA BSI cases from 2000 to 2006.64 The authors identified 
dialysis, organ transplantation, HIV infection, cancer and diabetes as the most important 
risk factors for infection. Additionally, the authors noted that the overall case-fatality rate 
was significantly higher in persons with MRSA BSI (39%) as compared to persons with 
MSSA BSI (24%). The mortality rate presented in this study was 4.7 deaths/100,000 
population/year for HAI and 2.0 deaths/100,000 population/year for community acquired 
infections. However, this study analyzed community and healthcare associated BSI cases 








1.3.2. Limitations of Current Research on Risk Factors for MRSA BSI and Future Needs 
Although several studies have set out to identify risk factors for MRSA BSI, they 
were limited by small sample sizes, single site settings and methodological issues such as 
inadequate control for severity of illness. Additionally, studies that utilized matching did 
not employ the correct statistical methods, which resulted in the use of control groups 
that were not selected independently of their exposure status. Several other studies 
reported independent predictors of MRSA BSI, however, this was not the primary aim of 
these studies, which set out to identify differences in outcomes in patients with MRSA vs. 
MSSA BSI.33, 63 In addition, existing studies vary in the control group chosen. For 
example, some studies used control groups consisting of patients with antibiotic-
susceptible BSI, which allows the researcher to identify predictors of resistance in BSI. 
However, other studies selected controls with no infection. In this instance, the predictors 
identified are predictors of BSI due to S. aureus. While most studies explored hospital-
wide risk factors, one focused on ICU patients. Additionally, most studies did not focus 
specifically on healthcare-associated infections. In this dissertation, I explore the risk 
factors for MRSA BSI using a large sample of hospitalized patients (Chapter 4) and focus 
specifically on healthcare-associated infections. I compare cases with MRSA BSI to 
patients with MSSA BSI. In addition, I conduct a matched comparison (1:2) of MRSA 
BSI cases with non-infected controls.  
1.4. System Level Factors Associated with MDRO Rates (Structures of Care) 
The next two sections discuss MDRO in general, without focusing specifically on 
MRSA. In this section, I describe the literature on the impact of institutional factors on 






Infection Control (SENIC) conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) 30 years ago was the first study to show a link between effective infection control 
and lower HAI rates.65 This national study of infection control departments measured 
infection control staffing ratios and intensity of infection control processes. The research 
team also measured the incidence of HAI in a stratified random sample of hospitals and 
showed that hospitals with better staffing and higher intensity of infection control 
processes had lower HAI rates. The authors identified several hospital level factors as 
significant predictors of HAI rates including hospital size, teaching status, region, nurse 
staffing ratios, infection preventionist (IP) staffing ratios, presence of hospital 
epidemiologists with training in infection control, and higher scores on surveillance 
and/or control indexes. Data for Aim I of this dissertation comes from the “Prevention of 
Nosocomial Infections and Cost Effectiveness” study,66 which has been modeled after 
and undertaken to update the findings of the SENIC study. Importantly, there have been 
few recent multi-center studies to identify systems-level risk factors for MDRO HAI. The 
findings of the SENIC study guide the hypotheses examined in this dissertation that 
administrative and organizational factors such as the presence and higher implementation 
of policies will have an impact on rates of MDRO in the hospital setting.  
A recent literature review on the association between staffing and rates of HAI 
suggests a link between higher level of nurse staffing and lower rates of HAI including 
MDRO.67 However, this review identified only 3 studies, which examined the link 
between IP staffing and HAI rates and found mixed results. For example, Richet et al. 
found that having a higher mean number of beds per infection control nurse was the only 






and physician staffing on wound infections failed to observe any significant relationship 
between staffing and infection rates.69 Other studies have found a link between high bed 
occupancy and high patient turnover and increased rates of MRSA70 supporting the 
hypothesis that hospital specific factors influence rates of MDRO.  
In recent years, there has been increased interest in the use of electronic 
surveillance systems (ESS) for tracking of HAI in order to improve case finding and 
decrease costs and time required for surveillance;71 however, the impact of ESS use on 
MDRO HAI rates is not well described and necessitates further study. Additionally, many 
states have begun mandatory reporting of HAI rates including rates of MDRO HAI,72, 73 
although there is a paucity of research on the effect of mandatory reporting on HAI 
rates.74 Aim II of this dissertation examines the relationship between institutional 
characteristics and rates of MDRO HAI (Chapter 3).  
1.5. Types of Infection Control Practices to Reduce MDRO (Processes of Care) 
Transmission of MDRO in hospitals has been attributed to inappropriate use of 
antibiotics, leading to selective pressure that drives resistance, and the lack of appropriate 
infection control measures in hospitals.22 There is a range of different infection control 
measures utilized for reducing antibiotic resistant infections in hospitals. These include 
proper hand hygiene, isolation and contact precautions, active surveillance, antibiotic 
restriction or stewardship and cohorting of patients in the same room.5 Although hand 
hygiene is one of the most effective and widely recognized infection control strategies for 
prevention of MDRO transmission,75 the unreliability of self-reported compliance with 
hand hygiene is widely recognized;76, 77 therefore, this dissertation does not specifically 






Active surveillance testing to identify patients colonized or infected with MRSA 
is one infection control policy instituted in some hospitals to combat MDRO infections. 
The idea behind active surveillance is that routine laboratory-based testing will not 
identify a significant proportion of patients who are colonized with MDRO and that those 
who are colonized but not symptomatic will serve as a reservoir for transmission of the 
pathogen in the hospital.78 Active surveillance is usually used to screen for MDRO in 
high-risk populations such as ICU patients, patients transferred from long-term facilities 
or other hospitals and those meeting other criteria for higher risk.79 Clearly, timeliness of 
the screening culture is very important. Currently, the gold standard for screening patients 
for MDRO such as MRSA is with the use of cultures, but there is at least a 48-hour delay 
between the time the culture is taken and the availability of results. The use of rapid 
screening methods such as the use of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays have been 
suggested to allow for earlier identification and isolation of colonized or infected 
patients.80 However, the utility of PCR as a stand-alone method of screening has not yet 
been established.81,82  
Once a surveillance culture is taken, the patient may be placed on contact 
precautions pending the results of the screening culture or the hospital may choose to 
wait to institute contact precautions until a positive result is found. Contact precautions 
refer to a set of practices aimed at reducing either direct or indirect transmission of 
pathogens from infected patients. These include the use of barrier precautions such as the 
use of gowns and gloves, and isolation practices such as placing infected or colonized 
patients in single rooms. Another infection control practice, cohorting of patients, refers 






those who are negative to prevent cross transmission.5 Antimicrobial stewardship is also 
used to prevent the development of MDRO and includes the use of automatic stop orders 
for antibiotics, the need for an infectious disease consult or pharmacy consult prior to 
prescribing certain antibiotics, and antibiotic prescribing policies developed by the 
hospital.83   
1.5.1. Current Recommendations for Infection Control Practices to Reduce MDRO HAI 
in Hospitals 
There is wide variation in published recommendations on infection control 
policies to reduce MDRO HAI. For example, the CDC guidelines written by the 
Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recommends the 
use of barrier precautions for patients with confirmed MDRO colonization or infection. 
However, the guidelines do not recommend routine surveillance cultures in settings with 
low MDRO prevalence.5 On the other hand, the Society for Healthcare Epidemiologists 
of America (SHEA) recommends surveillance cultures for all high risk patients upon 
hospital admission, as well as the use of preemptive barrier precautions for patients with 
pending surveillance culture results.84-86 At the current time, the Association for 
Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC) suggests pre-emptive 
isolation and contact precautions pending a screen but acknowledges lack of evidence for 
a stronger recommendation.87 Several European countries employ a search and destroy 
approach to combating MDRO, which includes screening for MDRO and isolation of 
patients found to be positive.88 The 5 Million Lives Campaign conducted by the Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) includes the following 5 components as part of an 






equipment, active surveillance, contact precautions for infected and colonized patients 
and use of central line and ventilator bundles.89 Furthermore, active surveillance for 
MRSA and other MDRO is currently being mandated or pending legislation in several 
states.71 
These wide variations in published recommendations underscore the need to 
identify effective surveillance and isolation strategies. Additionally, some researchers 
have raised concern about the adverse effects of using barrier and isolation precautions. A 
systematic review of the literature on the use of barrier precautions for patients with 
MDRO infections found evidence to show that the use of barrier precautions may be 
associated with less patient contact with healthcare providers, increased adverse events of 
noninfectious nature, delays in care as well as increased patient depression and 
dissatisfaction with received care.90,91 These findings further necessitate the need for 
additional evidence on the effectiveness of these interventions.  
1.5.2. Evidence on the Effectiveness of Infection Control Practices to Reduce MDRO 
HAI  
Data on effective infection control policies aimed at reducing multi-drug resistant 
HAI is lacking. A systematic review of evidence on the effectiveness of barrier 
precautions and surveillance cultures to control transmission of MDRO identified 7 
studies that solely examined the effectiveness of surveillance cultures.7 The researchers 
found that although 5 of these studies showed decreased rates of colonization and 
infection following the implementation of the intervention, these studies were of poor 
quality. The authors noted the difficulty of conducting these studies due to ethical 






research studies change their behavior simply in response to being observed. 
Additionally, the researchers noted that most studies on the effectiveness of barrier 
precautions and surveillance cultures examined their impact on MRSA and VRE, 
underscoring the need for a broader focus. The finding of this literature review were in 
agreement with a review conducted by McGinigle and colleagues who investigated the 
role of active surveillance cultures in decreasing rates of MRSA.92 Although the authors 
identified sixteen observational studies and the majority of these pointed to the 
effectiveness of active surveillance cultures in decreasing MRSA, they found the 
evidence base to be lacking due to the methodological flaws of the reviewed studies. 
Creamer et al. investigated the impact of rapid screening methods for MRSA in their 
hospital and noted that the use of PCR methods led to increased compliance with 
screening policies and allowed for earlier isolation of patients.93 However, the results of 
other studies have been mixed.94  
A study conducted by Weber et al. compared hospital wide versus targeted 
surveillance in ICUs for HAI and found that, although rates of infections due to MRSA 
and VRE were highest in the ICU, limiting surveillance to the ICU would result in 
missing 50% of infections due to MRSA or VRE.95 Another study compared the use of 
active surveillance for VRE vs. laboratory-based surveillance and found that three-
quarters of patients colonized with VRE would not be detected if the ICU relied solely on 
lab-based surveillance.96 However, other studies investigating the comparative 
effectiveness of active surveillance systems for VRE generated equivocal results.97, 98 






of these measures, many have argued against routine screening of all admissions to the 
hospital.54, 99,100    
Cooper et al. undertook a review of isolation precautions and rates of MRSA and 
noted the lack of well-designed studies to address the effectiveness of isolation 
precautions as a sole intervention. However, the authors did note some evidence pointing 
to the effectiveness of isolation precautions when combined with other infection control 
efforts.101 A recent study on the use of infection control practices to reduce MRSA in 
Europe found an association between placement of MRSA patients in single rooms and 
lower MRSA prevalence.102 The use of a search and destroy policy for MRSA in the 
Netherlands including the use of strict surveillance upon hospital admission and isolation 
of patient has been shown to be correlated with very low rates of MRSA colonization and 
infection.88 Halcomb and colleagues performed a literature search to identify the evidence 
base on the effectiveness of isolation practices on transmission of MRSA in hospitals.6 
The researchers identified seven studies that focused solely on patient isolation practices 
and found the evidence for use of isolation in single rooms and cohorting of MRSA 
patients to be lacking. The authors noted evidence to suggest that improving the use of 
contact precautions could result in reduced MRSA rates; however, they cautioned on the 
interpretations of these finding since the quality of the studies was lacking and only a 
small number of studies were included in the review.  
The use of policies restricting prescribing and use of antibiotics is considered to 
be of fundemental importance in efforts to reduce resistance.83 Several studies have 
shown an association between inappropriate prescribing and use of antibiotic and 






findings since most of the studies examining this relationship were small and limited to 
single site settings.106, 107 Larson et al. conducted a study to assess the relationship 
between antimicrobial control policies, hospital and infection control characteristics and 
antimicrobial resistance rates in 33 U.S. hospitals.108 The study found that only 30% of 
the hospitals had an antibiotic control policy. The researchers did not observe an 
association between the presence of an antibiotic control policy and rates of MRSA, VRE 
or ceftazidime-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae. However, the researchers did observe an 
association between increased systems-level efforts to implement the CDC’s hand 
hygiene guideline and lower MRSA and VRE rates.  
Numerous researchers have argued that one single policy will not solve the 
problem of MDRO HAI in hospitals and that a multi-pronged approach is needed to 
decrease rates.  Through the use of mathematical modeling, Bootsma and colleagues 
showed evidence to suggest that the most effective infection control interventions to 
reduce MRSA were ones that included screening in combination with other 
interventions;109 however, more research is needed to support these conclusions. Others 
have argued against focusing resources on a single resistant pathogen.110 Instead, these 
authors suggest a population-based approach to infection control, which would impact 
rates of all antibiotic resistant pathogens. For example, the authors show that focusing on 
reducing rates of BSI will have an even bigger impact on MRSA BSI, where a decrease 
in BSI of 12.5% would equal a 50% reduction in rates of BSI due to MRSA. 110    
1.5.3. Implementation of Infection Control Practices to Reduce MDRO in Hospitals 
There is paucity of data on the actual infection control practices implemented in 






in 2006 where they surveyed members of the Association of Professionals in Infection 
Control & Epidemiology (APIC).20 The researchers collected data on isolation measures 
taken for MRSA culture positive patients, whether active surveillance testing was done 
routinely to detect MRSA-colonized patients, the populations tested and the 
microbiologic methods used. This study showed that 45% of the 1237 surveyed hospitals 
performed hospital-wide HAI surveillance, whereas the rest targeted their surveillance 
methods. Less than a third of the hospitals (29%) reported the use of active MRSA 
surveillance testing; of these, half of the hospitals utilized routine media for testing 
(54%). The targeted populations included: long term care facility transfers (42%), other 
health care facility transfers (33%), readmissions (20%), patients on selected wards 
(18%), ICU (16%) or dialysis patients (14%). The majority of hospitals (72%) reported a 
policy for contact isolation for patients found to be colonized or infected with MRSA. 
These data show that less than one third of U.S. hospitals may engage in active 
surveillance for MRSA, which may have an impact on reported MRSA prevalence rates 
in the participating hospitals. Furthermore, of those that did perform active surveillance, 
the majority used non-selective media, which is less sensitive and may lead to 
underestimation of MRSA rates in this study. An important finding from this study is that 
the majority of MRSA cases were found on medical wards and not in the ICU resulting in 
serious implications for hospitals that target their screening programs to ICU patients. An 
important limitation of this study is its low response rate, which has an impact on the 
generalizability of the study results. According to the researchers, over 1200 health care 







Hansen et al. surveyed hospitals in 10 European countries to describe the range of 
policies employed for the prevention of MRSA in ICUs and surgical departments.111 The 
researchers investigated the use of isolation precautions, decolonization and screening 
methods as well as the use and availability of alcohol based hand sanitizers at the 
patients’ bedside. Data from 526 ICUs and 223 surgical departments were available. This 
study showed that the use of prevention measures related to MRSA varied widely 
between the countries. For example, the use of routine screening for newly admitted 
patients from other wards or hospitals ranged from 29% in Lithuanian ICUs and surgical 
departments to 100% in Slovakia. Isolation of MRSA patients in single rooms was 
another policy with a wide range of adoption (range = 41-100%). Differences in policies 
were also noted between the ICUs and surgical departments within the countries. Finally, 
the authors found that countries with the lowest MRSA rates were also the countries with 
the highest use of preventive policies but the authors could not investigate this 
relationship further using cross-sectional data. Richet and colleagues conducted a survey 
in 90 healthcare facilities in 30 countries in 1998 to determine the types of MRSA 
surveillance and control programs in these hospitals.68 In this survey, hospitals reported 
routine use of the following infection control policies aimed at reducing MRSA: use of 
gloves and gowns (62% and 44%, respectively), hand washing (53%), use of an isolation 
sign on the patient’s door (43%) and use of single rooms (34%). As did the study 
conducted by Hansen et al., this study noted a wide range of routine use of these policies 
between countries.  One study surveyed infectious disease consults that participate in the 
Emerging Infections Network and determined that the majority of those surveyed (86%) 






showed that although 50% of the respondents were in favor of the use of routine 
surveillance cultures for at least one MDRO, less than a third of them (30%) worked in a 
hospital where active surveillance cultures were performed routinely.112  
In a study by Fridkin and colleagues, the researchers set out to identify predictors 
of vancomycin use in ICUs participating in the National Nosocomial Infection 
Surveillance System.113 Data were obtained from 41 hospitals reporting on 108 ICU. The 
majority of hospitals (63%) reported that antimicrobial selection was based on diagnosis-
based guidelines. A third of the hospitals reported the presence of a written guideline 
outlining appropriate vs. inappropriate use of vancomycin. However, less than a fifth of 
the hospitals stated that preapproval was required prior to the use of vancomycin in their 
ICU. Zillich et al. conducted a survey to explore the relationship between antimicrobial 
use control strategies and rates of resistant pathogens in U.S. hospitals.114 This study 
found that more than half of the hospitals reported implementation of guidelines on the 
use and optimization of empirical antibiotic prophylaxis and found an association 
between the implementation of guidelines and reduced resistance rates. In a survey of 
laboratory directors from U.S. hospitals (n = 108), the range of policies related to 
antibiotic prescribing ranged widely from 85% for automated testing to 33% for offering 
molecular typing.115  
Gravel et al. conducted a cross-sectional study of acute care hospitals in Canada 
participating in the Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program to identify the 
infection control policies that these hospitals had in place to reduce C. difficile 
infections.116 Thirty-three of 41 hospitals participated in the study. Half of the hospitals 






availability of lab results. Respondents reported testing of liquid stool samples based on 
clinician’s order (70%), testing all liquid stools submitted whether or not C. difficile 
testing was ordered (24%), use of single rooms or cohorting of patients (88%), use of 
equipment designated for infected patients (27%), and policies for use of contact 
precautions by visitors (70%). This study is limited by inclusion of only those hospitals 
that participated in this particular surveillance system which are more likely to be major 
hospitals affiliated with universities. Additionally, this study did not collect data on 
policies related to antibiotic stewardship, which is considered to be an important strategy 
in controlling C. difficile infection rates.117   
Infection control departments were surveyed in another study conducted in 
Canada to examine the prevalence of infection surveillance and control activities.118 The 
vast majority of hospitals reported the use of isolation precautions for VRE and MRSA 
(99%) as well as C. difficile (80%). Less than half of the hospitals (46%) reported the 
presence of guidelines recommending appropriate antimicrobial therapies including drug 
choices, timing and duration of perioperative antibiotics. The authors noted that very few 
hospitals (13%) reported compliance with at least 80% of recommended surveillance 
policies. These authors conducted another study using the same sample of hospitals to 
examine the association between infection control policies and MDRO rates.119 Several 
infection control policies including reporting infection rates by specific risk groups and 
taking attendance at team meetings were independently associated with lower rates of 
MRSA. Higher rates of C. difficile infections were observed in larger hospitals and those 
hospitals reporting the authority to close wards in case of outbreaks, which may represent 






of MDRO seen in this study is lower than that reported in the U.S. which may impact the 
generalizability of the study results. Additionally, the authors did not investigate the 
infection control activities of interest in this dissertation including isolation/contact 
precautions, active surveillance and cohorting of patients. Although several studies have 
been conducted on the use of infection control practices in acute care hospitals, the extent 
to which infection policies related to MDRO are adopted by U.S. hospitals is not well 
described. This dissertation investigates the use of infection control policies using a 
national sample of National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) hospitals, as well as a 
separate sample of hospitals located in California.  
1.5.4. Factors Associated with the Presence and Implementation of Infection Control 
Practices to Reduce MDRO HAI  
Even when there is substantial evidence that certain policies are effective in 
reducing infection rates in hospitals and published guidelines recommend the adoption of 
these practices in the hospital setting, implementation is often lacking.120 Research 
suggests that recommended care is provided to only half of adult patients.121 However, 
there is paucity of research on the setting characteristics that influence the presence 
and/or implementation of infection control policies. The first aim of this study examines 
the relationship between structures of care and the presence and use of infection control 
policies in a national sample of hospitals.  
One study conducted by Fukuda and colleagues examined factors associated with 
system level activities for patient safety and infection control in Japan.122 The researchers 
noted an increased number of infection control activities in hospitals with a full time staff 






increased number of infection control activities included greater resources and higher 
profit margins in hospitals. A study by Chou et al. explored the relationship between 
implementation of infection control activities and formalization and standardization of 
protocols, centralization of decision making hierarchy, use of information technology, 
hospital culture, measures of effective communication and coordination between 
departments.8 The researchers found a link between these structural characteristics and 
measures of appropriate use of antibiotics and implementation of policies such as 
feedback to providers. The study conducted by Zillich et al. described in the previous 
section found a link between hospital bed size and Veterans Affairs status and rates of 
antibiotic resistance in U.S. hospitals.114 Flach and colleagues identified an association 
between the presence of several infection control policies and hospital teaching status, as 
well as high prevalence of at least one MDRO (defined as 10%) and the presence of the 
lab director on the hospital’s infection control committee.115 In their study, Zoutman et al. 
also noted a relationship between hospital bed size, teaching status, IP certification, 
computerization of surveillance and availability of references and the presence of 
infection control activities.118 However, these studies did not specifically examine the 
factors associated with the presence and implementation of the screening and infection 
control policies of interest in this dissertation. Aim I of this dissertation fills this gap in 
the literature (Chapter 2).  
1.6. Conceptual Framework: 
The conceptual model used in this dissertation is based on the work of 
Donabedian who formulated a conceptual framework to define quality of care as 
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1.7. Summary and Conclusion 
As described in the sections above, multi-drug resistant HAI represent a major 
source of morbidity and mortality in hospitalized patients. Although bloodstream 
infections represent a significant proportion of HAI in hospitals and more than half of 
BSI are resistant to methicillin, studies conducted to explore the risk factors for MRSA 
BSI have been limited to single site settings, utilized a small number of patients and were 
limited by methodological issues. Additionally, there is paucity of data on the use of 
infection control policies aimed at MRSA and other MDRO in hospitals in the United 
States, as well as factors associated with the presence and implementation of these 
policies.  
In this dissertation, I describe the use of infection control policies related to 
MDRO in a national sample of hospitals and the factors associated with their presence 
and implementation (Chapter 2). I examine the association between these infection 
control policies and rates of specific MDRO HAI (Chapter 3). Additionally, I explore risk 
factors for healthcare-associated MRSA BSI infections (Chapter 4). Finally, I summarize 














Implementation of Screening and Infection Control Interventions for Multi-Drug 








Infections caused by multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO) cause significant morbidity 
and mortality in intensive care units (ICUs) in the U.S. and around the world. Hospitals 
utilize different interventions to combat MDRO; however, adoption of these interventions 
is not well described. In 2008, we conducted a cross-sectional survey of 250 infection 
control directors at National Healthcare Safety Network hospitals in order to describe 
adoption of MDRO screening and infection control interventions in U.S. ICUs and 
identify predictors of their presence, monitoring and implementation.  Study ICUs 
routinely screened for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (59%), vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus (22%), multi-drug resistant gram negative rods (12%) and 
Clostridium difficile (11%). ICUs reported policies to screen all admissions for any 
MDRO (40%), screen periodically (27%), utilize presumptive isolation/contact 
precautions pending a screen (31%) and cohort colonized patients (42%). Several 
independent predictors of the presence and implementation of different interventions 
including mandatory reporting and teaching status were identified. This study found wide 
variation in adoption of MDRO screening and infection control interventions, which may 
reflect differences in published recommendations. Further research is needed to provide 
additional insight on effective strategies and how best to promote compliance.  
 
Keywords: Healthcare-Associated Infections, Multi-Drug Resistant Infections, Antibiotic 






2.2 Introduction  
Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) are one of the leading causes of death and 
a major source of morbidity in acute care hospitals.1 Part of this morbidity and mortality 
is due to increased antibiotic resistance in HAI, which renders standard treatment 
ineffective and potentially requires more toxic treatment. It has been estimated that more 
than 70% of bacteria that cause HAI are resistant to at least one antibiotic commonly 
used in treatment.2 Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus (VRE), and multi-drug resistant (MDR) gram negative rods 
(GNR) are several multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO) that have presented serious 
challenges.3-4 Additionally, although infections due to Clostridium difficile are not 
considered to be MDRO, they result in significant patient burden and are associated with 
frequent antibiotic use.5 Furthermore, there is increased focus on mandated public 
reporting of C. difficile and MDRO rates.6  
Due to the substantial burden caused by MDRO and C. difficile, identification and 
prevention of these infections remains a major component of infection control programs.  
Interventions often recommended to control MDRO and C. difficile include active 
surveillance, isolation/contact precautions, and cohorting of colonized/infected patients.  
However, there is wide variation in recommendations set forth by different organizations.  
For example, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines recommend 
use of barrier precautions for confirmed cases, but do not recommend routine 
surveillance cultures in low MDRO prevalence settings.7 Conversely, the Society for 
Healthcare Epidemiologists of America recommends surveillance cultures for all high 






cultures.8 Several European countries employ a more stringent ‘search and destroy’ 
approach that includes screening and isolation of patients considered high risk for MRSA 
carriage.9   
Although several studies have been conducted on the use of different infection 
control practices,10-15 adoption of specific MDRO and C. difficile screening and infection 
control policies in U.S. hospitals is not well described.  Additionally, research on setting 
characteristics that influence implementation of these interventions in intensive care units 
(ICUs) is lacking. Therefore, the aims of this large, cross-sectional study of U.S. hospitals 
were to:  
1) Describe adoption of MDRO and C. difficile screening and infection control 
interventions, as well as their implementation in ICUs.  
2) Investigate whether screening for specific MDRO (i.e., MRSA, VRE, MDR 
GNR) and C. difficile in ICUs varies with setting characteristics (i.e., hospital, 
infection control department and ICU characteristics).  
3) Examine whether presence, monitoring and/or implementation of screening and 
infection control interventions aimed at any MDRO vary with setting 
characteristics.  
2.3 Methods 
As part of a larger study, “Prevention of Nosocomial Infections and Cost 
Effectiveness Analysis,” R01NR010107, select National Healthcare Safety Network 
hospitals (NHSN) were surveyed in 2008. Eligibility criteria included conducting NHSN 
HAI surveillance in 2007 and a minimum of 500 device days. A modified Dillman 






was designed to be answered by the infection control department director. Respondents 
provided data on each medical, medical/surgical and surgical ICU at their hospitals. Test-
retest reliability of the survey was assessed (kappa = 0.88) and the survey was pilot tested 
by 3 infection preventionists (IPs) and 2 doctoral students.  
2.3.1 Independent Variables: 
 Hospital characteristics examined included geographic region (Northeast, South, 
Midwest, West) and state mandatory reporting of HAI (yes/no). Teaching status and 
bedsize were obtained from public data sources and telephone calls to hospitals. Infection 
control department characteristics included: presence of hospital epidemiologist (full-
time defined as 40 hours per week devoted to infection control, part-time defined as less 
than 40 hours and any [either part- or full-time]), proportion of IPs certified in infection 
control, number of IP full-time equivalents (FTE) per 100 beds, number of infection 
control staffing hours, number of IP staff and use of electronic surveillance systems for 
tracking of HAI (yes/no).  
2.3.2 Dependent Variables:    
To assess screening practices for specific organisms (Aim 2), respondents were 
asked whether each ICU routinely screened for: MRSA, VRE, C. difficile, and MDR 
GNR. Additionally, data were collected on 5 screening and infection control 
interventions (Aim 3): 1) screening ALL ICU admissions for any MDRO, 2) screening 
for any MDRO periodically after admission, 3) presumptive isolation/contact precautions 
pending a screen, 4) contact precautions for culture-positive patients and 5) cohorting of 
colonized patients. For each of these 5 interventions, we asked: Was a written policy in 






correctly implemented? Answer choices included: all the time (95-100%), usually (75-
94%), sometimes (25-74%), rarely/never (less than 25%) and don’t know. Fifteen 
outcomes were examined: presence, monitoring and correct implementation of each of 
the 5 interventions. Correct implementation was defined dichotomously as ≥75% versus 
<75% of the time based on distributions of responses.   
2.3.3 Data Analysis:  
Data were analyzed using Stata 11.1 (Stata Corporation, College Station, TX). 
Descriptive statistics were examined. We computed frequencies and percentages to 
determine adoption of different interventions (Aim 1).  To explore differences in 
screening for specific MDRO and C. difficile by setting characteristics (Aim 2), we 
constructed bivariate logistic regression models for each outcome including screening for 
any MDRO, MRSA, VRE, C. difficile or MDR GNR. The independent variables were the 
hospital, infection control department and ICU characteristics outlined previously. Those 
variables with a p-value of ≤0.1 were entered into multivariable logistic regression 
models to estimate the independent effect of each predictor on the presence of screening 
for specific MDRO and C. difficile. Additionally, potential confounding variables were 
added one by one into the model, and if the coefficient of a covariate changed by 10% or 
more, the variable was considered a confounder and entered into the final model. Finally, 
to examine whether presence, monitoring and implementation of interventions for any 
MDRO varied with setting characteristics (Aim 3), we constructed bivariate logistic 
regression models. Again, variables with a p-value of ≤0.1 were entered into 
multivariable models and confounding variables were added as previously described. 






estimators for all analyses to adjust for clustering at the hospital level.17 Correlations 
among variables were examined to assess collinearity. A p-value of <0.05 was considered 
statistically significant.  
2.4 Results 
 Of 441 eligible hospitals, 250 provided data on 413 ICUs (57% response rate). 
Table 1 provides demographic data of study hospitals. Almost half the hospitals were 
located in the Northeast (44%) and the majority was located in states with mandatory 
reporting of HAI (76%). Two-fifths reported presence of a part-time hospital 
epidemiologist (42%) while a full-time epidemiologist was present in only 6% of the 
hospitals. Of the independent variables, only total hours of infection control staffing and 
number of infection control staff were highly correlated (r = 0.90).  
2.4.1 Aim 1: Describe adoption of MDRO and C. difficile screening and infection control 
interventions.  
Study ICUs routinely screened for: MRSA (59%), VRE (22%), MDR GNRs (12%), 
and C. difficile (11%). A written policy to screen all admissions for any MDRO was 
reported for 40% of ICUs and 27% had a policy for periodic screening following 
admission (Table 2). Of those ICUs, the majority monitored implementation (80% and 
79%, respectively) and correct implementation ≥75% of the time was reported for 96% 
and 91% of the ICUs, respectively. Approximately a third reported a policy requiring 
isolation/contact precautions for patients with pending screens; 98% and 42% reported a 
policy for contact precautions for culture-positive patients and cohorting of colonized 
patients, respectively. The reported monitoring and correct implementation of these 






2.4.2 Aim 2: Investigate whether screening for specific MDROs and C. difficile varies 
with setting characteristics. 
 In bivariate analyses, ICUs in mandatory reporting states were more likely to screen 
for any of the specific MDRO (OR = 2.56, p-value = 0.002) and MRSA (OR = 2.37, p-
value = 0.004), whereas those located in the Midwest were less likely to screen for any 
MDRO (OR = 0.35, p-value = 0.012) and MRSA (OR = 0.32, p-value = 0.005). ICUs in 
hospitals with more than 500 beds were less likely to screen for C. difficile as compared 
to hospitals with 200 beds or less (OR = 0.21. p-value = 0.029). 
Table 3 presents the multivariable results. Adjusting for region and percent of IPs 
certified in infection control, teaching status, hospital bedsize (201-500 beds versus less 
than 201) and mandatory reporting remained independent predictor of screening for 
MRSA (OR = 2.41, p-value = 0.008, OR = 2.62, p-value = 0.029 and OR = 2.24, p-value 
= 0.040, respectively). Controlling for total hours of infection control and mandatory 
reporting, ICUs in hospitals with a part-time hospital epidemiologist were more likely to 
have a policy to screen for C. difficile (OR = 4.26, p-value = 0.009), whereas ICUs in 
hospitals with 201-500 beds were less likely to screen as compared with smaller hospitals 
(OR = 0.24, p-value = 0.021).   
2.4.3 Aim 3: Examine whether presence, monitoring and/or implementation of screening 
and infection control interventions aimed at any MDRO vary with setting characteristics.  
In bivariate analysis, state mandatory reporting (OR = 2.52, p-value = 0.003), 
teaching status (OR = 1.80, p-value = 0.048), hospital bedsize of 201-500 beds (OR = 
2.73, p-value = 0.009) and location in the Midwest (OR = 0.31, p-value = 0.015) were 






model, mandatory reporting, teaching status and location in the West remained 
significant predictors of the presence of this policy (Table 4).  
 Mandatory reporting (OR = 2.25, p-value = 0.028), teaching status (OR = 2.68, p-
value = 0.004) and use of electronic surveillance systems (OR = 1.95, p-value = 0.050) 
were positively associated with a policy to screen periodically after admission in bivariate 
analyses. Additionally, ICUs in hospitals with 201-500 beds were more likely to report 
this policy as compared to smaller hospitals (OR = 2.47, p-value = 0.043) and ICUs 
located in the Midwest and West were less likely to report this policy versus the 
Northeast (OR = 0.20, p-value = 0.001 and 0R = 0.28, p-value = 0.016, respectively). 
However, the presence of an electronic surveillance system, Midwest location and 
hospital size remained the only independent predictors of periodic screening in 
multivariable regression (OR = 2.45, p-value = 0.038, OR = 0.22, p-value = 0.040, and 
OR = 7.05, p = 0.037, respectively).  
Mandatory reporting states were negatively associated with having a policy for 
presumptive isolation/contact precautions pending a screen (OR = 0.47, p-value = 0.012) 
and was the only significant predictor of this policy in bivariate analysis. Although 
mandatory reporting was significantly associated with a policy to cohort colonized 
patients in bivariate analysis (OR = 1.91, p-value = 0.031), it was not an independent 
predictor of having this policy after controlling for region and the number of infection 
control staff.  
  In bivariate analyses, ICUs in hospitals with a full-time epidemiologist were more 
likely to monitor compliance with cohorting of colonized patients (OR = 6.65, p-value = 






epidemiologist was not significantly associated with monitoring the implementation of 
this policy (OR = 9.03, p-value = 0.067) after controlling for state mandatory reporting, 
region, number of infection control staff and proportion of IPs certified in infection 
control (data shown in Appendix 6.1.9).  
  Several setting characteristics predicted correct implementation of infection 
control policies ≥75% of the time. ICUs in hospitals with a greater proportion of certified 
IPs were less likely to report correct implementation of policy to screen new admissions 
(OR = 0.19, p-value = 0.008) after controlling for the number of infection control staff 
and region. In bivariate analyses, increasing infection control staffing hours were 
positively associated with correct implementation of periodic screening (OR = 1.01, p-
value = 0.004) and the presence of any hospital epidemiologist approached statistical 
significance (OR = 6.11, p-value = 0.070). Increasing number of infection control staff,  
and infection control staffing hours were positive predictors of correct implementation of 
the policy to isolate culture-positive patients in bivariate analysis (OR = 1.32, p-value = 
0.042, OR = 1.01, p-value = 0.017, respectively). Lastly, ICUs in the Midwest were 
significantly less likely to report correct implementation of a policy to cohort colonized 
patients (OR = 0.03, p-value = 0.008). However, we lacked sufficient power to assess 
these variables in multivariable analysis, or to assess the relationship between setting 
characteristics and contact precautions for patients with pending screens.  
2.5 Discussion 
 To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to examine adoption of these 
specific MDRO and C. difficile policies and to identify predictors of their presence and 






a small proportion screened for VRE, MDR GNR and C. difficile (11-22%). The vast 
majority reported a policy for contact/isolation precautions for culture-positive patients, 
which is congruent with other studies that reported high use of barrier/isolation 
precautions for infected patients.11,16,18  The presence of other MDRO-related infection 
control policies in our sample was low and may reflect wide variation in published 
recommendations on these interventions.  
State mandatory reporting was a significant independent predictor of screening for 
MDRO, which is expected given that hospitals may have an incentive to screen new 
admissions for MDRO in order to identify infections not attributable to the hospital stay. 
Teaching status was an independent predictor of MRSA screening and screening all 
admissions for any MDRO. Other studies found similar relationships between teaching 
status, use of procedures to monitor antimicrobial resistance and greater surveillance 
scores.12,14 Interestingly, ICUs in hospitals with higher percent of IPs certified in 
infection control were less likely to report correct implementation of policy to screen all 
admissions. One explanation is that more experienced IPs may be more accurate in 
reporting implementation, whereas less experienced IPs may over report adherence. 
Additionally, it may be the case that certified IPs are less strict about complying with 
policies for which the evidence-base is lacking.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, except for the presence of a hospital epidemiologist as 
an independent predictor of screening for C. difficile, infection control staffing did not 
independently predict the presence and/or implementation of interventions. This suggests 
that factors other than staffing are influencing the likelihood of implementing these 






institutional culture and suggest that these may be important in fostering adoption of 
infection control policies;19,20 however, we did not assess these in this analysis. Future 
studies should investigate the relationship between staffing, organizational support and 
the effect both may have on policy implementation. Additionally, with the current 
increase in mandatory reporting, IPs may be focusing on fulfilling mandates rather than 
implementing policies based on their experience and hospital needs. Further studies are 
warranted to assess how mandatory reporting influences the role, activities and goals of 
the infection control department including policy implementation.  
This study has several limitations. The data are cross-sectional preventing us from 
establishing temporality. Our study involved only NHSN hospitals, which in 2008 tended 
to be larger and more likely to be teaching. Eligibility criteria included a minimum 
number of device days, therefore, surveyed hospitals were on the larger end of the NHSN 
spectrum. Hospitals located in the Northeast were overrepresented, which may further 
limit generalizability. Additionally, data were self-reported by IPs which may be 
problematic in that IPs may have overestimated adoption of policies. Additionally, 
reported compliance may not be accurate since IPs do not spend substantial amounts of 
time in the ICU. Nonetheless, we were able to observe several significant predictors of 
full compliance with policies.  
There is significant variation in adoption of screening and infection control 
interventions aimed at MDRO and C. difficile in U.S. ICUs, which is congruent with data 
from other studies and may reflect wide variation in published recommendations. Several 
setting characteristics hypothesized to be important in predicting these interventions did 






reporting, geographic region, bedsize, presence of a hospital epidemiologist, teaching 
status and presence of an electronic surveillance system.  Further research is needed to 
confirm these findings and to identify additional factors that foster adoption of these 
interventions.  Additional research is also needed to strengthen the evidence base on the 
effectiveness of these interventions and facilitate the development of more standardized 
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 Table 1. Description of Hospitals and Intensive Care Units 
  Hospital Characteristics (N = 250)       
  Region   N % 
  Northeast  109 44 
  South  66 26 
  Midwest  40 16 
  West  35 14 
  Mandatory Reporting (State)   189 76 
 Bed Count       
  < 201   50 20 
 201 - 500   145 58 
  > 501   55 22 
  Length in NHSN/NNIS (years)       
  < 1   33 13 
  1-3   78 31 
  < 3   134 54 
 Missing   5 2 
 Electronic Surveillance System    
  Yes  63 25 
  No  183 73 
 Missing  4 2 
  Presence of Hospital Epidemiologist       
  Full-time  15 6 
  Part-time  105 42 
    
  Median Range 
 Proportion of IPs certified in infection control 50% 0 – 100% 
 Number of  IP FTE per 100 beds 0.61 0 – 4.75 
    
 ICU Characteristic (N = 413)    
  ICU Type        N % 
  Medical  102 25 
  Medical/Surgical  222 54 
  Surgical  89 22 
FTE = Full Time Equivalent, ICU = Intensive Care Unit,  IP = Infection Preventionist, 




















Table 2. Extent to which ICUs have written infection control policies related to MDRO, monitor 





Monitoring for  
Implementation* 
ICUs Reporting Correct 
Implementation At Least 
75% of the Time*  
N % N % N % 
Screen ALL patients for any 
MDRO upon admission 164 40 131 80 126 96 
Screen periodically after 
admission 110  27 87 79 79 91 
Presumptive isolation 
pending screen results 128 31 61 48 59 97 
Contact precautions for 
culture positive patients 404 98 264 65 255 97 
Cohorting of colonized 
patients  175 42 87 50 50 57 
ICU = Intensive Care Unit, MDRO = Multi-Drug Resistant Organism 
*Monitoring of Implementation was assessed among those ICUs that reported the presence of a 
written policy and correct implementation was assessed among those ICUs that reported 






Table 3. Multivariable Logistic Regressions Examining Predictors of Screening  for Specific 
MDRO 
OR 95% CI  P-value 
Predictors of Screening for any MDRO (n = 296) 
Mandatory reporting 3.53 1.54 – 8.08 0.003 
Region (vs.Northeast)   
South 0.91 0.35 – 2.36 0.849 
Midwest 0.53 0.16 – 1.74 0.296 
West 0.70 0.23 – 2.09 0.524 
Number of infection control staff 1.14 0.89 – 1.46 0.301 
Bedsize (vs. < 201)    
201 – 500 4.18 1.45 – 11.99  0.008 
> 500 0.96 0.23 – 4.02 0.959 
Predictors of Screening for MRSA (n = 359) 
Mandatory reporting 2.24 1.04 - 4.84 0.040 
Teaching 2.41 1.26 – 4.61 0.008 
Region (vs.Northeast)   
South 0.71 0.32 – 1.55 0.386 
Midwest 0.47 0.16 – 1.40 0.175 
West 0.52 0.18 – 1.50 0.228 
Bedsize (vs. < 201)    
201 – 500 2.62 1.10 – 6.24 0.029 
> 500 1.11 0.43 – 2.88 0.836 
Percent IP Certified 0.62 0.26 – 1.50 0.288 
Predictors of Screening for Clostridium difficile (n = 367) 
Total hours of infections control 1.00  0.98 – 1.01 0.614 
Bedsize (vs. < 201)    
201 – 500 0.24 0.07 – 0.81 0.021 
> 500 0.11 0.01 – 1.83 0.123 
Presence of part-time HE 4.26 1.43 – 12.68 0.009 
Mandatory reporting 1.21 0.36 – 4.04 0.753 
 
All variables entered into each model are presented in the table.  
  
















Table 4. Predictors of Presence of Infection Control Policies in Multivariable Analysis 
  OR 95 % CI  P-value 
Screening All Patients on Admission for Any MDRO (n = 361) 
Mandatory reporting 3.34 1.51 – 7.38 0.003 
# of FTE IPs per 100 beds 1.01 0.54 – 1.88 0.987 
Teaching 2.30 1.18 – 4.46 0.014 
 Region (vs.Northeast)    
South 1.38 0.64 – 2.97 0.413 
Midwest 0.97 0.34 – 2.78 0.949 
West 0.28 0.10 – 0.78 0.015 
Bedsize (vs. < 201)    
201 – 500 2.74 0.93 – 8.10  0.068 
> 500 1.78 0.56 – 5.78 0.326 
Screening Periodically After Admission (n = 411) 
Mandatory reporting 1.62 0.56 – 4.67 0.375 
Electronic surveillance system 2.45 1.05 – 5.71 0.038 
Teaching 2.44 0.95 – 6.24 0.063 
Region (vs.Northeast)    
South 1.64 0.65 – 4.12 0.294 
Midwest 0.22 0.05 – 0.93 0.040 
West 0.37 0.11 – 1.31 0.123 
Percent IP certified 1.67 0.53 – 5.01 0.397 
Number of infection control staff 1.00 0.76 – 1.32 0.988 
Bedsize (vs. < 201)    
201 – 500 7.05 1.12 – 44.40 0.037 
> 500 4.43 0.61 – 31.88 0.139 
Contact Precautions for Culture Positive Patients (n = 355) 
Mandatory Reporting     0.73      0.13 – 4.16 0.725 
# of FTE IPs per 100 beds     0.63      0.32 – 1.22 0.172 
Percent of IPs certified     0.02      0.01 – 1.18 0.060 
Cohorting of Patients 
Mandatory reporting     1.16      0.51 – 2.62 0.727 
Region (vs.Northeast)    
South     0.52      0.21 – 1.29 0.157 
Midwest     0.30      0.10 – 0.92 0.035 
West     0.47      0.17 – 1.32 0.154 
Number of infection control staff     1.14      0.96 – 1.35 0.127 
All variables entered into each model are presented in the table.  











Impact of Infection Control & Surveillance Policies on Rates of Multi-Drug Resistant 









The study objective is to describe the use of infection control policies aimed at multi-drug 
resistant organisms (MDRO) in California and assess the relationship between these 
policies, structural characteristics and rates of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) or vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) bloodstream infections (BSI) and 
Clostridium difficile infections. 
Methods:  
Data on infection control policies, structural characteristics, and MDRO rates were 
collected through a 2010 survey of California infection control departments. Bivariate 
and multivariable Poisson and negative binomial regressions were conducted.  
Results:  
180 hospitals provided data (response rate=54%). Targeted MRSA screening upon 
admission was reported by the majority of hospitals (87%); however, few reported 
targeted admission screening for VRE and C. difficile. The majority of hospitals 
implemented contact precautions for confirmed MDRO and C. difficile patients; 
presumptive isolation/contact precautions for patients with pending screens were less 
frequently implemented. Hospitals with a certified infection control director had 







Although most California hospitals are involved in activities to decrease MDRO, there is 
variation in specific activities utilized with the most focus placed on MRSA. This study 
highlights the importance of certification and its significant impact on infection rates. 
Additional research is needed to confirm these findings.   
Key Words:  
Antibiotic resistance, infection control policies, multi-drug resistant infections, 







3.2 Introduction:  
Healthcare associated infections (HAI) due to multi-drug resistant organisms 
(MDRO) are an important patient safety concern. Multiple studies have shown that 
MDRO infections are associated with greater patient morbidity and mortality, as well as 
increased healthcare costs.1-4 Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and 
vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) species are two MDRO that have presented 
some of the greatest challenges in the healthcare setting.5-6 In fact, surveillance for and 
reporting of MRSA and other MDRO is currently being mandated or pending legislation 
in several states (Association of Professionals in Infection Control & Epidemiology, 
2010), underscoring the importance of these infections. In addition, although not 
specifically considered MDRO, infections caused by Clostridium difficile are associated 
with the frequent use of antibiotics and also result in significant patient burden.7-8 
Transmission of both MDRO and C. difficile in hospitals has been attributed in 
part to inappropriate use of antibiotics, leading to selective pressure that drives resistance, 
and the lack of appropriate infection control measures in hospitals.9 Infection prevention 
programs utilize a range of infection control measures to reduce antibiotic resistant 
infections in the hospital setting. These include encouraging proper hand hygiene, 
isolation and contact precautions, active surveillance, antibiotic restriction or 
stewardship, and cohorting of colonized or infected patients.10 However, there is wide 
variation in published recommendations on the actual use of these measures.10-14 
This variation underscores the need to identify effective strategies, but such data 
are currently scant. Several recent systematic reviews have been conducted to summarize 






other infection control policies to control transmission of MDRO.15-18  Although the 
reviews noted some evidence of effectiveness, all of the authors pointed to the overall 
poor quality and methodological flaws of the reviewed studies.15-18 Based on the lack of 
quality evidence and lack of data regarding the cost effectiveness of these measures, 
many have argued against routine screening of all admissions to the hospital.19-20 
Through the use of mathematical modeling, Bootsma and colleagues showed evidence to 
suggest that the most effective infection control interventions to reduce MRSA were ones 
that included screening in combination with other interventions;21 however, more 
research is needed to support these conclusions. Others have argued against focusing 
resources on a single resistant pathogen.22 Instead, these authors suggest a population-
based approach to infection control, which could result in reduced transmission of a 
number of antibiotic resistant pathogens.  
  In addition to the gaps in the evidence regarding effective infection control 
policies directed at MDRO infections, there is also lack of data on the actual 
implementation of infection control policies in hospitals in the United States. Although 
several studies have been conducted on the use of different infection control practices in 
acute care hospitals,23-25 the extent to which infection control strategies related to MDRO 
are adopted is not well described. Furthermore, there is paucity of data exploring 
structural (i.e. hospital and infection control department) characteristics that influence 
MDRO and C. difficile rates. Therefore the aims of this study were to:  
1) describe the use of infection control policies aimed at reducing MDRO and C. 






2) assess the relationship between the presence and/or correct implementation of 
infection control policies for multi-drug resistant infections, structural 
characteristics and rates of BSI caused by MRSA or VRE and infections caused 
by Clostridium difficile. 
We hypothesized that increased intensity of infection control policies is associated with 
decreased rates of MRSA and VRE BSI and C. difficile infection, controlling for 
potential confounders or structures of care characteristics. 
3.3 Methods:   
Data for this study are from a large cross-sectional study of California hospitals. 
The aim of this larger study funded by the Blue Shield of California Foundation (Grant # 
2490932) was to explore the impact of mandatory reporting on the role of infection 
preventionists (IPs) and HAI rates. The analysis presented in this paper included data 
from the 2010 survey of California hospitals. 
3.3.1 Recruitment and Enrollment 
All non-specialty acute care facilities in California were eligible to participate; 
psychiatric facilities, drug/alcohol rehabilitation centers, nursing homes, outpatient units, 
and children’s hospitals were excluded. In total, 331 hospitals were eligible to participate 
in this study. Participants were recruited by the Association for Professionals in Infection 
Control and Epidemiology, Inc. (APIC) and the Columbia University School of Nursing 
research staff during an eight-week period from April to June 2010. A modified Dillman 
technique was used including electronic and print invitation letters as well as emails and 
telephone calls encouraging incomplete responders to participate in the survey.26 






control department and the director or coordinator from each hospital’s infection 
prevention and control department, was asked to complete this web-based survey. Survey 
announcements were also included in APIC e-newsletters to facilitate recruitment. As an 
incentive to participate, eight weekly lotteries to win an APIC textbook were offered to 
participants who completed the survey.  
3.3.2 Conceptual Framework & Data Elements 
The conceptual framework used in this study was based on the quality of care 
definition developed by Donabedian.27  It is defined as being comprised of the structures, 
processes and outcomes of care (Figure 1).  
Structures of Care 
The structures of care characteristics of interest in this study are hospital 
characteristics such as number of beds, teaching status, hospital setting 
(urban/suburban/rural) and hospital participation in quality improvement (California 
Hospital Assessment and Reporting Task Force [CHART], Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement’s (IHI) Five Million Lives Campaign, California Healthcare-Associated 
Infections Prevention Initiative (CHAIPI) and others).  Structures of care also included 
infection control department characteristics such as infection control staffing defined as 
the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) IPs per 100 beds (presuming a 40-hour work 
week), presence of a full-time and part-time Physician hospital epidemiologist, total 
hours of infection control staffing hours, total number of IPs and the use of electronic 
surveillance systems for tracking of HAI.  






The processes of care examined in this study were infection control and 
surveillance policies aimed at reducing MDRO including: 1) screening all new patients 
for the specific MDRO upon admission, 2) screening select patients for the specific 
MDRO upon admission, 3) screening all patients for the specific MDRO periodically 
after admission, 4) implementing presumptive isolation/contact precautions pending 
results of a screen, 5) implementing contact precautions for patients with positive 
cultures, and 6) conducting surveillance of microbiology results for new cases of the 
specific MDRO. Data on these policies were collected for MRSA, VRE and C. difficile 
hospital-wide surveillance separately. If respondents indicated that they screened select 
patients for the specific MDRO upon admission, they were prompted to indicate what 
population was being screened: readmissions within 30 days of discharge, transfers from 
nursing homes/long term healthcare facilities, ICU patients, dialysis patients and/or other. 
Those respondents who indicated that their hospital screened select patients periodically 
after admission were asked whether the populations screened included ICU, dialysis 
and/or other patients.  
Respondents who indicated the presence of written infection policies outlined 
above for hospital-wide MRSA surveillance were asked about the intensity with which 
the policy was implemented and the possible answer choices were: all of the time (95-
100%), usually (75-94%), sometimes (25-74%), rarely/never (<25%), monitor but don’t 
know the proportion, and no monitoring. Questions about intensity were asked only about 
MRSA in order to reduce respondent burden. For the analysis, intensity of each of the 
policies was assessed as a dichotomous variable: 95% of the time or greater vs. other. In 






about the method used to collect surveillance cultures for MRSA including standard 
culture, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or other rapid diagnostic test, MRSA selective 
agar, other, or do not collect surveillance culture. Respondents were also asked whether 
the hospital promoted the use of soap and water handwashing after caring for patients 
with C. difficile-associated diarrhea.  Finally, participants were also asked whether their 
hospital had a policy regarding antibiotic restriction (yes/no/don’t know) and if yes, they 
were asked to describe the policy in an open-ended question.  
 Although hand hygiene is one of the most effective and widely recognized infection 
control strategies for prevention of MDRO transmission,28 the lack of reliability of self-
reported compliance with hand hygiene is widely recognized,29-30 therefore, we did not 
collect data on hand hygiene compliance.  
Outcomes of Care 
 The outcomes of care assessed were rates of MRSA BSI, VRE BSI and C. difficile 
infections. Therefore, respondents were asked to provide the following hospital-wide data 
for the first quarter of 2010: total number of inpatient days, total number of central line 
days, number of healthcare-associated MRSA BSI, number of healthcare-associated VRE 
BSI, and number of healthcare-associated C. difficile infections. In addition to entering 
the rates, the respondents were also allowed to select the following answer choices: 
‘don’t monitor’, ‘prefer not to answer’ and ‘no hospital level data.’ For VRE BSI and 
MRSA BSI rates, the numerator was the number of BSI events caused by the specific 
organism and the denominator was the total number of central line days.  For the C. 
difficile infection rate, the numerator was the number of C. difficile infections and the 






3.3.3 Statistical Analysis 
 Data analysis was conducted using Stata Version 11.1 (Stata Corporation, College 
Station, Texas). Descriptive analyses included frequencies, percentages, medians and 
interquartile ranges. The three sets of dependent variables explored in this study were 
healthcare-associated MRSA BSI, VRE BSI, and C. difficile infection rates. The 
independent variables included the structures and processes of care variables described 
previously; the unit of analysis was the hospital. We used two methods to examine 
predictors of MRSA BSI rates. Since the variance of these outcome measures was greater 
than their respective means indicating over-dispersion,31-32 and examination of the 
dispersion parameter alpha in the likelihood ratio chi-squared test showed that the 
dispersion parameter of the count model differed significantly from zero, providing 
further evidence of over-dispersion,32 we used negative binomial regression. In addition, 
we also examined predictors of MRSA BSI rates by conducting bivariate Poisson 
regression with a dispersion parameter. Poisson regressions were conducted to examine 
predictors of VRE BSI and C. difficile rates as the assumption of mean equal to variance 
was met. Expected incidence rate ratios (IRR) were calculated for all models. 
 To test the hypothesis that increased intensity of infection control policies is 
associated with decreased rates of MRSA and VRE BSI and C. difficile infection, we first 
explored whether simply having a policy in place was associated with decreased rates. 
Then we explored the association between full compliance with policies defined as 95% 
of the time or more (versus other) and infection rates. For all of the analysis, we first 
conducted bivariate regressions to identify the infection control policies and structural 






 Multivariable regressions were only conducted for MRSA BSI as we lacked a 
sufficient sample to identify independent predictors of VRE BSI and C. difficile rates. 
Those variables significant in bivariate analysis with a p-value < 0.2 were entered into a 
multivariable model to assess the independent predictors of MRSA BSI rates. All of these 
variables were checked for confounding and were considered confounders if the 
coefficients of the other selected variables changed by more than 10% when the assessed 
variable was removed from the model. Those variables that met this criteria were kept in 
the final model.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Hospital Demographics 
 In total, 203 hospitals completed the overall survey for a response rate of 61%. Of 
those, 180 completed questions in the MDRO section of the survey (response rate 54%). 
Table 1 provides the demographic data for study hospitals. Less than half of the hospitals 
reported the presence of a hospital epidemiologist (n = 96, 44.8%), with a full-time 
hospital epidemiologist reported by only 6 hospitals (3.4%). Half of hospitals reported 
that the director in charge of the infection control department was certified in infection 
control (n = 89, 51.2%); in the majority of the cases the infection control director was a 
member of APIC or the Society for Healthcare Epidemiologists of America (SHEA). The 
median IP staffing ratio was 0.53 FTE IP per 100 beds in the study sample (interquartile 
range = 0.35 – 0.87). The mean MRSA BSI rate provided by 91 hospitals was 0.43 
MRSA BSI per 1000 central line days (median = 0, range = 0, 8) and the mean VRE BSI 
rate was 0.21 VRE BSI per 1000 central line days (median = 0, range 0, 3.2). Finally, the 






inpatient days (median = 0.41, range = 0, 2.3).  
3.4.2 Adoption of MDRO Infection Control Policies 
 Table 2 presents data on the adoption of infection control policies aimed at MDRO 
in California hospitals. The vast majority of hospitals reported that a surveillance culture 
(n = 174, 97.2%) was collected at admission; the specific populations cultured included 
transfers from nursing homes (n = 140, 77.8%), readmissions within 30 days (n = 136, 
75.6%), ICU patients (n = 131, 72.8%), dialysis patients (n = 114, 63.3%), all admissions 
excluding labor and delivery (n = 36, 20%). Less than a third of hospitals reported 
screening all patients for MRSA upon admission (n = 52, 29.4%). The use of targeted 
screening for MRSA upon admission was reported more frequently (n = 151, 87.3%); 
however, few hospitals reported targeted screening upon admission for VRE and C. 
difficile (6.7% and 3.9%, respectively). The most frequently screened groups for MRSA 
included readmissions within 30 days (89.4%), transfers from nursing homes (96.0%), 
ICU patients (86.8%), dialysis patients (76.8%) and patients with specific medical 
conditions (55.0%). The vast majority of hospitals reported policies to implement contact 
precautions for patients positive for MRSA (n = 166, 93.3%), VRE (n = 117, 65%), and 
C. difficile (n = 151, 83.9%). Policies for presumptive isolation/contact precautions for 
patients with pending screens were less frequently implemented. Only a third of hospitals 
had a policy regarding antibiotic restriction (n = 64, 36.4%) including the use of pre-
approvals, stop orders or use of formularies.   
 The most frequently used method for MRSA surveillance was standard culture 
(36.7%), MRSA selective agar (32.2%) and PCR (23.9%).  The reported compliance with 






hospitals reported that the policy to implement contact precautions for patients with 
positive MRSA cultures and to perform surveillance of microbiology results for new 
MRSA cases was correctly implemented 95% of the time or more, (n = 86 and 65, 
respectively). Full compliance with the other infection control policies aimed at MRSA 
was less frequently reported by the hospitals (data shown in Appendix 6.2.1).   
3.4.3 Predictors of MRSA BSI  
 In bivariate analysis, hospitals participating in the IHI campaign and those reporting 
the presence of an infection control director certified in infection control had significantly 
lower rates of MRSA BSI (IRR = 0.30 and 0.32, p-values = 0.01 and 0.02, respectively). 
The only MRSA infection control policies significantly associated with lower MRSA BSI 
rates in bivariate analysis was surveillance of microbiology results for new MRSA cases 
(IRR = 10.02, p = 0.05). Moreover, due to the lack of variation in hospitals reporting the 
presence of policies for periodic MRSA screening of all patients, we were unable to 
assess the association between the presence of this policy and MRSA BSI rates.  
 In the multivariable models presented in Table 3, we assessed the association 
between each of the infection control policies aimed at MRSA and MRSA BSI rates, 
controlling for structural characteristics. The adjusted IRR for hospitals that reported the 
presence of a policy to screen all patients for MRSA upon admission was 10.2 times 
higher compared with hospitals that did not report this policy (p-value = 0.01). 
Conversely, those hospitals with a policy to target new admissions for MRSA screening 
showed a significantly lower MRSA BSI rates as compared to hospitals that did not 
report this policy (IRR = 0.03, p-value = 0.01), controlling for the infection control 






remaining MRSA infection control policies and MRSA BSI rates. The presence of an 
infection control director certified in infection control was a significant predictor of lower 
MRSA BSI rates in the first two models (p < 0.01, respectively) and approached 
statistical significance in the last two models (p = 0.06 and 0.05, respectively). The total 
number of infection control hours did not have an independent effect on MRSA rates in 
the multivariable model and the IP per beds staffing ratio was an independent predictor of 
MRSA BSI rates in only one model (adjusted IRR = 0.13, p-value = 0.05). The results of 
the Poisson regressions with a dispersion parameter were very similar to the results 
obtained with negative binomial regressions (data shown in Appendix 6.2.8 & 6.2.9). We 
show the results of the negative regression, as this approach allowed us to calculate 
incidence rate ratios and was a more conservative approach. The presence of a certified 
infection control director was an independent predictor of lower MRSA BSI rates in all 
four models.  
 An examination of the association between full compliance (all of the time vs. 
other) with infection control policies related to MRSA and MRSA BSI rates, revealed no 
statistically significant results (results shown in Appendix 6.2.7).  
3.4.4 Predictors of VRE BSI 
 Several setting characteristics were significant predictors of lower VRE BSI rates in 
bivariate analysis (Table 4). Presence of a full-time hospital epidemiologist and total 
hospital epidemiologist hours were both highly statistically associated with higher VRE 
BSI rates (IRR = 11.9 and 1.03, p-values 0.004 and 0.009, respectively). Participation in 
CHART and in any initiative was associated with lower VRE BSI rates (IRR = 0.29 and 






screening of new admissions, approached statistical significance (IRR = 3.31, p-value = 
0.08). Since very few hospitals reported the presence of the two policies for periodic 
screening, we lacked sufficient power to assess the relationship between these two 
policies and VRE BSI rates. 
3.4.5 Predictors of C. difficile 
 In bivariate analyses, hospitals located in rural settings showed a significantly lower 
C. difficile rate (IRR = 0.41, p-value = 0.05) as compared to hospitals located in the urban 
setting (Table 4). Higher total number of infection control director hours was associated 
with higher C. difficile rates (IRR = 1.02, p-value = 0.05). None of the infection control 
policies aimed at C. difficile were associated with C. difficile rates.  
3.5 Discussion  
 This study is one of the few to explore the relationship between the presence and 
implementation of infection control policies, structural characteristics and rates of 
MDRO infections in a large group of hospitals in the United States. One of the major 
strengths of this analysis is a large sample of California hospitals and the use of standard 
National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) definitions for healthcare-associated 
infections.33  
 This study was conducted more than a year after the institution of mandatory 
reporting of MRSA and VRE BSI and C. difficile rates, as well as legislation requiring 
targeted screening for MRSA,34 and the majority, but not all, hospitals (87%) reported the 
presence of a policy to target new admissions for MRSA screening. A survey of Los 
Angeles County hospitals conducted in 2008 prior to the institution of legislation for 






screening.35 Our data demonstrate greater adoption of this policy but indicate a definite 
lag between implementation of regulations and implementation of policies in the 
hospitals.  
 The data also indicate that MRSA remains the main focus of infection control 
programs as most hospitals reported activities aimed at preventing MRSA infections 
whereas less attention was placed on surveillance and control of VRE and C. difficile. 
These data are consistent with results presented by Peterson and colleagues who also 
found that MRSA was the most frequently screened organism, followed by VRE, 
methicillin-susceptible S. aureus and C. difficile.35 Since targeted MRSA screening is 
mandated by the State of California, it appears that infection control departments are 
potentially reacting to legislation and focusing on fulfilling mandates, which may or may 
not be in line with the infection control priorities of their hospital. This poses a potential 
risk that the additional time and resources required to fulfill mandates may prevent IPs 
from proactively determining the most important infection control priorities in their 
individual setting and instituting policies aimed at these emerging issues. Additional 
research is needed to determine the degree to which these types of mandates are aligned 
with the actual needs of the hospitals and the degree to which they impact infection rates 
and the role of infection control personnel.    
 The most frequently reported methods for MRSA surveillance in our sample of 
hospitals were standard culture or use of MRSA selective agar in more than two-thirds of 
hospitals; PCR was used in almost one-fourth.  This differs slightly from what was 
reported by a national study conducted by APIC in 2006, in which only 8% reported the 






cultures for at least certain high-risk groups, the majority used standard cultures for 
which results are available only after 1-3 days. Importantly, since few hospitals report the 
use of presumptive isolation or contact precautions for patients with pending results and 
institute isolation only when culture results are positive, the usefulness of screening at 
admission is greatly diminished as these patients remain a potential reservoir for 
transmission.  
 In our study, having an infection control director who was certified in infection 
control was a significant independent predictor of lower MRSA BSI rates. A study 
conducted by Krein and colleagues reported an association between the presence of a 
certified IP and use of policies aimed at reducing catheter-related BSI36 but to our 
knowledge, this is the first study that has demonstrated a link between staff certification 
and lower MDRO rates. It is possible that infection control director certification may 
directly influence MRSA BSI rates through the adoption of evidence-based practices 
instituted by a potentially more experienced and knowledgeable director, or that 
certification is an indicator of the overall quality of the organization and a more 
supportive organizational climate. The impact of certification on quality of care and 
patient outcomes merits further investigation. 
 Few infection control policies were shown to be significant predictors of infection 
rates in our study, which may be due to a lack of statistical power to detect small 
differences. In this study, we did observe a significant relationship between universal 
screening policies upon admission (as opposed to no active surveillance screening or 
targeted screening) and higher rates of MRSA BSI. This is not surprising since expanding 






in higher reported rates of infections.  
3.5.1 Limitations 
 One limitation of this study is its cross-sectional nature, which prevents us from 
determining temporality. Data on the timing of the policies and how long these policies 
were in place prior to the observation of the infection rates was not collected. An 
additional weakness is reliance on self-reported data regarding the presence and intensity 
of infection control processes and infection rates. However, collection of these data 
through direct observation or review of medical records would be extremely costly in 
time and resources and would prohibit the use of a large sample. The estimates reported 
in this study are likely to be, if anything, over-reported. There is a possibility of selection 
bias in that hospitals with high intensity of infection control processes and low 
healthcare-associated infection rates may have been more likely to participate in this 
study. However, since this analysis was not the primary aim of the study, the potential for 
this selection bias should be minimal. Additionally, when we compared hospitals that 
provided data with those that did not, there were no significant differences between the 
two groups in terms of location, participation in initiatives or infection control staffing 
levels (data not shown). Although there is the possibility of slight variation in definitions 
of infections across settings, this variation should be minimal since this study includes 
only California hospitals that are mandated by law to report their BSI and C. difficile 
rates to the NHSN and are therefore using NHSN definitions. An additional limitation is 
the lack of data on MDRO rates from all of the participating hospitals. Lastly, this study 
is restricted to acute care hospitals in California, which may limit the generalizability of 







 There is still much to be learned about the factors that influence a hospital’s 
adoption of infection control policies and rates of MDRO. This study highlights the 
importance of infection control certification as an important predictor of healthcare-
associated infection rates. It also demonstrates the continued focus placed on MRSA as 
evidenced by policies instituted by infection control departments, potentially in response 
to state mandates. Also evident is the use of screening using standard culture techniques 
without concurrent implementation of contact precautions for potentially 
infected/colonized patients, which may diminish the utility of these policies. Further 
research is needed to confirm these findings and to generate quality data on the most 
effective infection prevention and control policies aimed at MDRO healthcare-associated 
infections in order to strengthen the evidence base and facilitate the development of more 






3.7  References 
1. Cosgrove SE, Sakoulas G, Perencevich EN, Schwaber MJ, Karchmer AW, 
Carmeli Y. Comparison of mortality associated with methicillin-resistant and methicillin-
susceptible Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia: a meta-analysis. Clin Infect Dis 
2003;36:53-9. 
2. Elixhauser A. Clostridium Difficile-Associated Disease in U.S. Hospitals, 1993-
2005. AHRQ Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Statistical Brief 2008;50:1-11. 
3. Stone PW, Gupta A, Loughrey M, et al. Attributable costs and length of stay of an 
extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae outbreak in a 
neonatal intensive care unit. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:601-6. 
4. Cosgrove SE, Qi Y, Kaye KS, Harbarth S, Karchmer AW, Carmeli Y. The impact 
of methicillin resistance in Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia on patient outcomes: 
mortality, length of stay, and hospital charges. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 
2005;26:166-74. 
5. Deshpande LM, Fritsche TR, Moet GJ, Biedenbach DJ, Jones RN. Antimicrobial 
resistance and molecular epidemiology of vancomycin-resistant enterococci from North 
America and Europe: a report from the SENTRY antimicrobial surveillance program. 
Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis 2007;58:163-70. 
6. Klein E, Smith DL, Laxminarayan R. Hospitalizations and deaths caused by 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999-2005. Emerg Infect Dis 
2007;13:1840-6. 







8. McCusker ME, Harris AD, Perencevich E, Roghmann MC. Fluoroquinolone use 
and Clostridium difficile-associated diarrhea. Emerg Infect Dis 2003;9:730-3. 
9. Boyce JM. Should we vigorously try to contain and control methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus? Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1991;12:46-54. 
10. Siegel JD, Rhinehart E, Jackson M, Chiarello L. Management of Multidrug-
Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention; 2006.  
11. Elimination of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
Transmission in Hospital Settings. 2007. (Accessed April 12, 2010, at 
http://www.apic.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PracticeGuidance/APICEliminationGuides
/mrsa_elim_guide.pdf.) 
12. LeDell K, Muto CA, Jarvis WR, Farr BM. SHEA guideline for preventing 
nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant strains of Staphylococcus aureus and 
Enterococcus. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:639-41. 
13. Muto CA, Jarvis WR, Farr BM. Another tale of two guidelines. Clin Infect Dis 
2006;43:796-7; author reply 7-8. 
14. Muto CA, Jernigan JA, Ostrowsky BE, et al. SHEA guideline for preventing 
nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant strains of Staphylococcus aureus and 
enterococcus. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:362-86. 
15. Aboelela SW, Saiman L, Stone P, Lowy FD, Quiros D, Larson E. Effectiveness of 
barrier precautions and surveillance cultures to control transmission of multidrug-







16. McGinigle KL, Gourlay ML, Buchanan IB. The use of active surveillance 
cultures in adult intensive care units to reduce methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus-related morbidity, mortality, and costs: a systematic review. Clin Infect Dis 
2008;46:1717-25. 
17. Cooper BS, Stone SP, Kibbler CC, et al. Isolation measures in the hospital 
management of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA): systematic review 
of the literature. BMJ 2004;329:533. 
18. Halcomb EJ, Cert G, Griffiths R, Fernanez R. The role of patient isolation and 
compliance with isolation practices in the control of nosocomial MRSA in acute care. . 
Int J Evid Based Healthcare 2008;6 206-24. 
19. Diekema DJ, Climo M. Preventing MRSA infections: finding it is not enough. 
JAMA 2008;299:1190-2. 
20. Dancer SJ. Considering the introduction of universal MRSA screening. J Hosp 
Infect 2008;69:315-20. 
21. Bootsma MC, Diekmann O, Bonten MJ. Controlling methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus: quantifying the effects of interventions and rapid diagnostic 
testing. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2006;103:5620-5. 
22. Wenzel RP, Bearman G, Edmond MB. Screening for MRSA: a flawed hospital 
infection control intervention. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008;29:1012-8. 
23. Jarvis WR, Schlosser J, Chinn RY, Tweeten S, Jackson M. National prevalence of 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in inpatients at US health care facilities, 






24. Richet HM, Benbachir M, Brown DE, et al. Are there regional variations in the 
diagnosis, surveillance, and control of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus? Infect 
Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:334-41. 
25. Sunenshine RH, Liedtke LA, Fridkin SK, Strausbaugh LJ. Management of 
inpatients colonized or infected with antimicrobial-resistant bacteria in hospitals in the 
United States. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2005;26:138-43. 
26. Dillman DA, Smyth JD. Design effects in the transition to web-based surveys. 
Am J Prev Med 2007;32:S90-6. 
27. Donabedian A. The quality of care. How can it be assessed? JAMA 
1988;260:1743-8. 
28. Boyce JM, Pittet D. Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-Care Settings. 
Recommendations of the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee and 
the HIPAC/SHEA/APIC/IDSA Hand Hygiene Task Force. Am J Infect Control 
2002;30:S1-46. 
29. Haas JP, Larson EL. Compliance with hand hygiene guidelines: where are we in 
2008? Am J Nurs 2008;108:40-4. 
30. Jenner EA, Fletcher BC, Watson P, Jones FA, Miller L, Scott GM. Discrepancy 
between self-reported and observed hand hygiene behaviour in healthcare professionals. J 
Hosp Infect 2006;63:418-22. 
31.  Cameron AC, Trivedi PK. Regression analysis of count data. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1998.  







33. Horan TC, Andrus M, Dudeck MA. CDC/NHSN surveillance definition of health 
care-associated infection and criteria for specific types of infections in the acute care 
setting. Am J Infect Control 2008;36:309-32. 
34. California Health and Safety Code: Medical Facility Infection Control and 
Prevention Act. In: 296 CCR, Section 12558; 2008. 
35. Peterson A, Marquez P, Terashita D, Burwell L, Mascola L. Hospital methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus active surveillance practices in Los Angeles County: 
Implications of legislation-based infection control, 2008. Am J Infect Control 
2010;38:653-6. 
36. Krein SL, Hofer TP, Kowalski CP, et al. Use of central venous catheter-related 
















































Table 1. Hospital Demographic Data (N = 180) 
 N % 
Teaching 48  26.8 
Presence of Hospital Epidemiologist   
Any 96 44.8 
Full-time 6 3.4 
Missing 6 3.4 
Participation in CHAIPI 36 20.0 
Participation in CHART 105 58.3 
Participation in IHI 99 55.0 
Participation in other initiative 58 32.2 
Participation in any initiative 150 83.3 
   
Infection Control Director certified in infection control (n = 
174)  
89 51.2 
Infection Control Director member of SHEA/APIC (n = 175) 157 89.7 
Electronic Surveillance System (n = 179) 53 29.6 
 Median Interquartile 
Range 
Hospital Bedsize 173 100 - 340 
Infection Control Director hours 40 25 - 50 
# of Hospital Epidemiologists* 2 1 - 2 
Hospital Epidemiologist hours 4 1 - 8 
# of Infection Preventionists 1 0 - 2 
Total Infection Preventionist hours 52 40 - 81 
Proportion of Infection Preventionists certified in infection 
control  
0.25 0 - 1 
# of FTE Infection Preventionists per 100 beds 0.53 0.35 - 0.87 
Total infection control hours (Infection Preventionist + 
Director) 
94.5 80 - 137 
*either full time or part time 
APIC = Association of Professionals in Infection Control & Epidemiology, Inc., CHAIPI = 
California Healthcare-Associated Infections Prevention Initiative, CHART = California Hospital 
Assessment and Reporting Taskforce, FTE = Full-time Equivalents, IHI = Institute for Healthcare 






Table 2. MDRO Infection Control Policies in California Hospitals (N = 180) N % 
Collection of a surveillance culture upon hospital admission for any group of 
patients 174 97.2
All admissions 36 20
Readmissions within 30 days of discharge  136 75.6
Transfers from nursing homes 140 77.8
ICU patients 131 72.8
Dialysis patients 114 63.3
Other  83 46.1
Screen all patients for MRSA upon admission  52 29.4
Target new admissions for MRSA screening 151 87.3
Screen all patients for MRSA periodically after admission 5 2.8
Screen select patients for MRSA periodically after admission  22 12.6
Implement presumptive isolation/contact precautions pending a MRSA screen  61 34.3
Implement contact precautions for patients with positive MRSA cultures 166 93.3
Perform surveillance of microbiology results for new cases of MRSA 130 73
Screen all new patients for VRE upon admission  1 0.6
Screen select patients for VRE upon admission  12 6.7
Screen all patients for VRE periodically after ICU admission  1 0.6
Screen select patients for VRE periodically after ICU admission  2 1.1
Implement presumptive isolation/contact precautions pending a VRE screen  21 11.7
Implement contact precautions for patients with positive VRE cultures 117 65
Surveillance of microbiology results for new VRE cases 95 52.8
Screen all new cases for C. difficile upon admission  1 0.6
Screen select patients for C. difficile upon admission  7 3.9
Screen all patients for C. difficile periodically after admission  0 0
Screen select patients periodically for C. difficile after admission  2 1.1
Implement presumptive isolation/contact precautions pending a C. difficile 
screen 84 46.7
Implement contact precautions for patients with positive test 151 83.9
Conduct surveillance of microbiology results for new C. difficile cases 119 66.1
Promote the use of soap and water after caring for patients with C. difficile 
associated diarrhea 136 75.6










Table 3. Predictors of MRSA BSI rate per 1,000 central line days in multivariable analysis  
(N = 36) 
 Coef p-value IRR* 95% CI+ 
Model 1      
Screen all patients for MRSA upon admission 2.33 0.01 10.23 1.62 – 64.5 
Infection Control Director hours 0.09 0.07 1.09 0.99 – 1.20 
Infection Control Director certified in infection 
control  
-2.01 <0.01 0.13 0.03 – 0.58 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -3.71 0.05 0.02 0.001 – 0.95 
Participation in IHI -0.74 0.27 0.48 0.13 – 1.78 
Model 2      
Target new admissions for MRSA screening -3.51  0.01 0.03 0.01 – 0.43 
Infection Control Director hours 0.08 0.18 1.08 0.96 – 1.22 
Infection Control Director certified in infection 
control  
-2.29 <0.01 0.10 0.03 – 0.39 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -2.17 0.09 0.11 0.01 – 1.43 
Participation in CHART 0.89 0.34 2.43 0.39 – 15.27 
Model 3     
Screen select patients for MRSA periodically after 
admission 
-1.07 0.24 0.34 0.06 – 2.02 
Infection Control Director hours 0.05 0.17 1.05 0.98 – 1.13 
Infection Control Director certified in infection 
control  
-1.21 0.06 0.30 0.09 – 1.03 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -1.43 0.27 0.24 0.02 – 2.95 
Participation in IHI -0.73 0.26 0.48 0.14 – 1.71 
Model 4     
Implement presumptive isolation/contact 
precautions pending a MRSA screen 
-0.16 0.84 0.85 0.18 – 4.02 
Infection Control Director hours 0.05 0.21 1.05  0.97 – 1.13 
Infection Control Director certified in infection 
control  
-1.35 0.05 0.26 0.07 – 1.00 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -1.60 0.27 0.20 0.01 – 3.25 
Participation in IHI -0.73 0.25 0.48 0.14 – 1.67 
*All of the variables entered into the model are shown in the table.  
CHART = California Hospital Assessment and Reporting Taskforce, CI = Confidence Interval, 








Table 4. Significant Structural Predictors of VRE BSI rates and C. difficile infections in 
bivariate analysis 
 Coef p-value IRR 95% CI 
VRE BSI*(N = 91)     
Participation in CHART -1.26 0.01 0.29 0.11 – 0.75 
Participation in any initiative -1.52 <0.01 0.22 0.09 – 0.54 
Physician Hospital Epidemiologist 
hours 
0.03 <0.01 1.03 1.01 – 1.06 
Presence of a Full-time Hospital 
Epidemiologist 
2.48 <0.01 11.9 2.22 – 63.90 
C. difficile† (N = 105)     
Setting (reference group = urban)     
Suburb -0.33 0.27 0.72 0.40 – 1.29 
Rural -0.89 0.05 0.41 0.17 – 1.00 
Infection Control Director hours 0.02 0.05 1.02 1.00 – 1.04 
*per 1,000 central line days 
†per 1,000 inpatient days 










Risk Factors for Bloodstream Infections with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 








The study objective is to compare risk factors for hospital-acquired methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bloodstream infections (BSI) using two sets of controls-- 
controls with methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) BSI and non-
infected controls-- in a large sample of hospitalized patients. 
Methods:  
A nested case control study was conducted utilizing three years of administrative, clinical 
and infection control data from four hospitals. Cases were compared to unmatched 
controls with MSSA BSI. Additionally, cases were 1:2 matched with non-infected 
controls. Traditional and conditional logistic regressions were conducted.  
Results:  
A total of 204 cases with MRSA BSI and 301 controls were identified during the study 
period. 201 cases were matched to 402 non-infected controls. The independent risk 
factors differed between the two comparison groups and also depending on whether 
antibiotic exposure was used in the model. The three independent risk factors for MRSA 
BSI as compared to MSSA BSI were older age ( p = 0.048), major organ transplant (p = 
0.016) and quinolone use (p = 0.016). Cases were more likely than non-infected controls 
to have renal failure (p = 0.003), cirrhosis (p = 0.013), and a central venous catheter (p = 







This large case-control study allowed us to assess risk factors for MRSA BSI 
using two sets of controls and showed that risk factors for MRSA BSI differed greatly 
depending on the control group chosen. More importantly, these results confirm the need 
for careful selection of appropriate controls groups, especially when studying antibiotics 
as potential risk factors for MRSA BSI, as well as the need to carefully adjust for 
underlying severity of illness. Further research is needed to identify proper controls in 
these types of studies.  
Key Words: 
Antibiotic resistance, multi-drug resistant infections, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 







4.2  Introduction 
Healthcare-associated infections (HAI) cause significant morbidity and mortality 
in acute care settings (1). Part of this morbidity and mortality is due to increased 
resistance to antibiotics in HAI. Currently, it is estimated that more than 70% of bacteria 
that cause HAI are resistant to at least one antibiotic that is commonly used in treatment 
of the infection (2). Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has been the 
focus of much research in the last several decades due to its major contribution to the 
morbidity and mortality of hospitalized patients (3-6).   
Staphylococcus aureus can cause serious infections at many body sites; it is the 
most common cause of bloodstream infections (BSI) (7). It is estimated that 
approximately one-third of patients with BSI caused by S. aureus develop local 
complications or distant septic metastases (8). These infections are even more 
complicated when the S. aureus strain is resistant to methicillin or other semi-synthetic 
penicillins and result in increased mortality, length of stay, as well as higher hospital 
costs for patients with resistant infections as compared to those with a BSI that is caused 
by methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) (9-13). Differences in 
morbidity and mortality due to these two infections are posited to be the result of 
variations in virulence of the causative strains, vulnerabilities of the populations affected 
and delays in receiving drug therapies appropriate for the infection (10, 13).  
Due to the fact that MRSA BSI is a major contributor to the morbidity and 
mortality of hospitalized patients, it is important to identify factors that place patients at 
risk of developing MRSA BSI. Knowledge of the modifiable risk factors for MRSA BSI 






control policies. Several researchers have attempted to identify predictors of MRSA BSI 
in hospitals (12, 14-20). However, the majority of these studied were limited by small 
sample sizes, single site settings and methodological issues such as inadequate control for 
severity of illness. Additionally, studies that utilized matching failed to employ statistical 
methods to adjust for the lack of independence among cases and matched controls.  
Several researchers reported independent predictors of MRSA BSI, however, this 
was not the primary aim of these studies, which set out to identify differences in 
outcomes in patients with MRSA vs. MSSA BSI (13, 19). In addition, existing studies 
varied in the control group chosen. For example, most studies used control groups 
consisting of patients with antibiotic-susceptible BSI, which allows the researcher to 
identify predictors of resistance in BSI. However, researchers have hypothesized that 
using controls with MSSA BSI may overestimate the association between antibiotic use 
and MRSA BSI since prior use of antibiotics such as oxacillin is likely to prevent 
infection with strains of bacteria that are susceptible to that particular antibiotic (21). On 
the other hand, other studies selected controls with no infection. In this comparison, the 
predictors identified are predictors of BSI due to S. aureus. Many of these studies did not 
adequately control for severity of illness. Additionally, most studies did not focus 
specifically on healthcare-associated infections but grouped community-acquired and 
healthcare-associated infections together which may mask some important hospital-
related risk factors.  
4.3 Objective 
 The objective of this study was to identify risk factors for healthcare-associated 






NewYork Presbyterian Hospital (NYPH) System. Specifically, the aim was to compare 
risk factors for hospital-acquired MRSA BSI using two sets of controls-- controls with 
MSSA BSI and non-infected controls-- in a large sample of hospitalized patients. This 
study involves a secondary analysis of a dataset compiled as part of the “Distribution of 
the Costs of Antimicrobial Resistant Infection” study funded by the National Institute of 
Nursing Research (R01NR010822).  
4.4 Methods 
 Data were obtained from four New York City hospitals that make up the NewYork 
Presbyterian Hospital System, the largest hospital system in New York. It is comprised of 
Milstein Hospital, a tertiary academic health center (642 beds) located in a low-income, 
immigrant community of Washington Heights, and Weill Cornell (866 beds), which is 
also a tertiary hospital, located in an affluent neighborhood. Morgan Stanley Children’s 
Hospital of New York (CHONY) (282 beds) is a pediatric hospital located in Washington 
Heights, and Allen Hospital (205 beds) is a community hospital in Inwood with a 
significant population of patients transferred from skilled nursing facilities. As part of 
NYPH, the four hospitals share one Clinical Data Warehouse (CDW), which integrates 
data from over 20 clinical databases including laboratory, radiology, pathology, 
diagnostic data sources among many others.  As part of the larger study, a database was 
created, which linked data from the CDW with operating room, administrative, cost 
accounting and electronic health records data that were routinely collected. The linkage 
between the different data sources was performed using medical records numbers unique 






4.4.1 Case and Control Selection  
 This study used de-identified data from the four hospitals for the years 2006 
through 2008, including data on all patients admitted to NYPH in these three years. In 
order to be considered hospital-associated in our study, we defined BSI as those that 
manifested at least 48 hours after admission. Case and controls were defined using an 
algorithm defined for the larger study and based on the National Healthcare Safety 
Network (NHSN) definitions for primary BSI (22). NHSN is a surveillance network 
through which hospital report HAI rates to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and NHSN definitions have become the recognized standard for defining 
infections around the world (23). For the purposes of this study, the NHSN definitions 
were modified to focus on electronically available data, given the large number of 
potential cases to evaluate.  
Case (MRSA BSI) 
 Positive blood culture for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
AND 
 No positive culture with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus at other body 
sites within 14 days prior to positive blood culture 
 We used two sets of controls. Patients with MRSA BSI were compared to patients 
with MSSA BSI to determine the risk factors for methicillin resistance (unmatched). In 
addition, non-infected controls were matched to cases on age (± 5 years), minimum 
length of exposure (number of days hospitalized prior to development of BSI in cases), 






days of hospital stay) and hospital to determine the risk factors for MRSA BSI (using 2:1 
matching). The two sets of controls were defined using the following criteria:  
Control (MSSA BSI) 
 Positive blood culture with methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus 
AND 
 No positive culture with methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus at other 
body sites within 14 days prior to positive blood culture 
Non-Infected Control  
 No positive blood culture for ANY organism 
4.4.2 Data Elements 
The risk factors examined in this study are presented below and were based on a 
review of the existing literature.    
Patient Characteristics 
Demographic Characteristics 
The demographic factors considered were gender (male/female) and age 
(continuous variable defined as age at discharge). Age was used as a matching factor for 
the comparison of cases to non-infected controls and gender was investigated as a 
potential risk factor for MRSA BSI using MSSA BSI controls.  
Intrinsic Risk Factors Prior to Hospitalization 
Prior hospitalization and stay in a skilled nursing facility (SNF) have been 
identified as risk factors for MRSA BSI in several studies (14-15, 17). To investigate the 
specific role that prior hospitalization plays in increasing risk for BSI, we examined 






and days since the hospitalization in the prior year. History of stay at a SNF within the 
prior year was also examined and defined based on the admission source from 
administrative data and by matching admission addresses to known SNF in the area.  
Clinical Risk Factors  
Data on the following risk factors were also collected (yes/no): diabetes mellitus, 
malignancy, trauma, open wound, chronic dermatitis, renal failure, burns (involving 10 % 
or more of the body or 3rd degree), history of major organ transplant, history of substance 
abuse, asthma, chemotherapy, congestive heart failure, cirrhosis, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD), cardiovascular disease, decubitus ulcer, hepatitis B and C 
infection, HIV infection, neurological disease, rheumatoid arthritis and tracheostomy. 
These risk factors were identified using ICD 9 codes and present on admission indicators. 
A Charlson co-morbidity score was also calculated as a measure of the patient’s health 
status at admission using ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes for conditions present on 
admission (25).   
Encounter-Specific Variables: 
Antibiotic & Immunosuppressive Medication Use 
History of antibiotic use has also been implicated as a risk factor for the 
development of resistant infections (26-28). In this data set, the following variables were 
available on medication use: medications administered during the hospital stay, day when 
medication was first and last administered, and total number of days medication was 
administered. Using these variables, we defined exposure to antibiotics and 
immunosuppressive drugs for cases and the two comparison groups in the time period at 






also examined as a potential risk factor for infection with MRSA BSI. Antibiotic 
exposure was assessed in two ways: overall exposure to an antibiotic in the time period at 
risk, exposure to specific classes of antibiotics including aminoglycosides, carbapenems, 
cephalosporins, glycylcylines, macrolides, monobactams, penicillins, polypeptides, 
quinolones, sulfonamides, tetracyclines and other antibiotics. Exposure to medications 
was examined as a dichotomous variable and defined as occurring during the period at 
risk for the cases and MSSA BSI controls. For non-infected controls, exposure was 
assessed during the corresponding period at risk for their matched case.  
Procedure-based Risk Factors  
The use of central venous and urinary catheters prior to infection was investigated 
as potential risk factors for infection in this study. Data on the total days of central 
venous lines and urinary catheters prior to infection (or during the matched time at risk 
for the non-infected controls) were available and allowed us to investigate prolonged use 
of these devices as potential risk factors for infection. In addition, the occurrence of each 
of the following procedures in the patient’s period of risk were assessed as potential risk 
factors: specialized cardiac procedure (either cardiac catheterization, coronary 
angioplasty, cardiac angiography, or vascular stenting), intubation, dialysis 
(hemodialysis), insertion of feeding tube, major organ transplant, general anesthesia, 
open biopsy, any operating room procedure performed in encounter lasting 30 minutes or 
more, major operating room diagnostic or therapeutic procedure defined according to the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) classifications. For the comparison of 
cases with MSSA BSI controls, the occurrence of these procedure- based risk factors was 






cases with matched non-infected controls, exposure to these risk factors was defined as 
during the period of risk for each index case and during the corresponding period at risk 
for the matched control.  
Outcome Variable  
The following variables were utilized to define cases and the two sets of controls 
using the algorithm described previously: BSI, BSI with MRSA, hospital day when 
MRSA BSI was detected, MSSA BSI, hospital day when MSSA BSI was detected, year 
of admission, day of discharge, length of stay.  
4.4.3 Statistical Analysis 
Data were entered and analyzed in STATA 11.1 (Stata Corporation, College 
Station, Texas). In the first analysis, we assessed risk factors for MRSA resistance in BSI 
by comparing MRSA BSI cases to controls with MSSA BSI. Mann-Whitney tests for 
continuous non-parametric variables and Chi-squared tests or Fisher’s exact tests for 
categorical variables were used in bivariate analysis as appropriate. Multivariable logistic 
regression models were used to assess the independent effect of these variables on the 
risk of developing a resistant BSI. The second analysis assessed risk factors for MRSA 
BSI by comparing cases with MRSA BSI and non-infected matched controls using 
conditional logistic regression. Specifically, we used conditional logistic regressions to 
account for matching on age, period at risk, early ICU stay and hospital.  
For both analyses, variables with a p-value ≤ 0.1 in bivariate analysis were 
included in multivariable analysis to estimate the probability of MRSA BSI. In addition, 
all predictors were checked for confounding, effect modification and colinearity. Possible 






estimates of a covariate changed by 10% or more, the variable was considered to be a 
confounder and added to the model. Effect modification between covariates was 
evaluated by testing of interaction terms for variables that were conceptually potential 
effect modifiers. Due to the fact that antibiotic exposure data was not electronically 
recorded at two hospital sites for the whole length of the study resulting in antibiotic 
exposure data missing for a substantial number of cases, multivariable models for both 
analysis were run two ways: including and excluding antibiotic risk factors. Multi-
colinearity was assessed by examining tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) of 
the variables in the models. The goodness of fit of the models was assessed using the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test for logistic regression and the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) for conditional logistic regression. A p-value of < 0.05 was 
considered statistically significant.  
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Comparison of MRSA BSI and MSSA BSI patients 
A total of 204 cases with MRSA BSI and 301 controls with MSSA BSI were 
identified during the study period. Patient demographic, clinical and encounter-based risk 
factors are summarized in Table 1. Bivariate analysis identified five risk factors that 
differed significantly between cases and controls. Cases were more likely than controls to 
be older (p <0.001), have renal failure (p <0.001) and a tracheostomy (p = 0.02) present 
on admission, as well as have a urinary catheter (p = 0.001), dialysis (p = 0.009) and a 
major organ transplant (p = 0.018) during their encounter prior to the development of 
BSI. In addition MRSA BSI cases had a higher Charlson severity of illness measure than 






partial mediator of the relationship between organ transplant and the outcome. Cases 
were more likely than controls to have had a major organ transplant (OR = 3.4, 95% CI = 
1.04 – 11.24) and this association was diminished when adjusted for immunosuppressive 
medication use prior to BSI (OR = 3.02, 95% CI = 0.90 – 10.12).  
Cases and controls were also compared in terms of exposure to antibiotics prior to 
the development of BSI (Table 2); quinolone exposure was the only class of antibiotics 
that was significantly associated with an increased risk of BSI with MRSA (p = 0.001). 
Overall antibiotic exposure and exposure to monobactams approached statistical 
significance (p-values of 0.059 and 0.056, respectively).  
In the multivariable logistic regression model excluding antibiotic risk factors (N 
= 504), three independent risk factors for MRSA BSI were identified: older age (OR = 
1.01, p = 0.001), renal failure (OR = 1.58, p = 0.029) and major operating room 
therapeutic procedure (OR = 1.68, p = 0.032). In addition, major organ transplant 
approached statistical significance as an independent risk factor (OR = 4.90, p = 0.052). 
When antibiotic risk factors were added to the model (N = 330), the three independent 
risk factors for MRSA BSI were older age (OR = 1.01, p = 0.048), major organ transplant 
(OR = 14.0, p = 0.016) and quinolone use prior to development of BSI (OR = 3.41, p = 
0.016). No differences in the models were seen whether urinary catheter exposure was 
assessed as a dichotomous variable or as the number of catheter days prior to 
development of BSI (data shown in Appendix 6.3.4 and 6.3.5).  
4.5.2 Comparison of MRSA BSI cases and non-infected matched controls 
Overall, 1:2 matching on early ICU stay, age, hospital and minimum time at risk 






comparison of MRSA BSI cases and their matched non-infected controls.  Cases and 
controls differed significantly on a variety of factors including gender (p = 0.016), 
hospitalization in the prior year (p = 0.008), severity of illness as measured by the 
Charlson score (p = 0.001), history of malignancy (p = 0.020), renal failure (p < 0.001), 
cirrhosis (p = 0.009),  tracheostomy (p = 0.026), central venous catheter use (p <0.001), 
major OR therapeutic procedure (p = 0.005) and the number of days spent in the ICU (p 
= 0.005). Bivariate analysis of differences in antibiotic use between cases and controls is 
summarized in Table 2. As in the comparison of cases with MSSA BSI controls, cases 
were significantly more likely to have been exposed to quinolones in the period at risk 
than their corresponding non-infected controls (OR = 4.2, p = 0.003).  
Multiple independent risk factors for MRSA BSI were identified in a 
multivariable logistic regression model excluding antibiotic risk factors (N = 595). These 
included male gender (OR = 1.62, p = 0.017), malignancy (OR = 1.87, p = 0.047), renal 
failure (OR = 2.71, p < 0.001), cirrhosis (OR = 3.63, p = 0.008), HIV infection (OR = 
4.53, p = 0.029), and central venous catheter use (OR =2.36, p = 0.001). Cases were less 
likely than their matched controls to have a major OR procedure in their time period at 
risk (OR = 0.64, p = 0.042). In the smaller multivariable model including antibiotic use 
(N = 358), cases were more likely than controls to have renal failure (OR = 2.74, p = 
0.003), cirrhosis (OR = 4.03, p = 0.013), and a central venous catheter (OR = 3.08, p = 
0.003). After controlling for the other risk factors, quinolone exposure was no longer a 
significant predictor of MRSA BSI infection (p = 0.206). As in the previous model, 
controlling for the other risk factors, cases were less likely than controls to have a major 






significant (OR = 0.57, p = 0.055). Central venous catheter use had the same independent 
impact on the risk of BSI, whether it was assessed as a continuous days variable or as a 
dichotomous variable (data shown in Appendix 6.3.6 and 6.3.7).  
4.6 Discussion 
We performed a large case-control study to evaluate risk factors for MRSA BSI 
and utilized two sets of controls. Although we improved upon the design of the previous 
studies by employing a large sample, using two control groups, and adjusting for 
underlying differences between cases and uninfected controls through the use of 
matching, we found similar results to what has been published previously in the literature 
verifying the validity of previously published studies.  
We found that the risk factors for MRSA BSI differed depending on the control 
group chosen. This is in contrast to a study assessing risk factors for MRSA surgical site 
infections (SSI) in older adults where the researchers utilized two sets of controls; 84 
patients with SSI due to MRSA were compared to 64 patients with MSSA SSI and 167 
patients without SSI, potentially allowing to differentiate between risk factors for MRSA 
SSI and SSI due to any S. aureus (29). Using two separate multivariate models, the 
researchers showed that requiring assistance in three or more activities of daily living, 
and wound class were independently associated with MRSA BSI using both controls 
groups.  
A study by Graffunder and colleagues of 121 MRSA patients and 123 MSSA 
controls, identified levofloxacin, belonging to the class of quinolones, and macrolides as 
independent risk factors for MRSA infection as compared to MSSA infection (although 






factors in bivariate analysis but macrolide use failed to remain an independent predictor 
of MRSA BSI when entered into a multivariable model in our study. Importantly, in our 
study exposure to quinolones was an independent predictor of MRSA BSI as compared to 
MSSA BSI but not in the comparison of MRSA BSI patients and non-infected controls. 
This confirms the results obtained by Ernst and colleagues who evaluated the importance 
of control group selection in studies assessing the association between use of antibiotics 
and MRSA BSI and utilized two sets of controls: one group with MSSA BSI and another 
group without BSI (18). Specifically, the researchers argued that the appropriate control 
group to be used when assessing antibiotic exposure as a potential risk factor in a case 
control study is a non-infected control group, since those patients who take an antibiotic 
effective in treatment of a MSSA would be much less likely to develop an infection with 
a susceptible organism. Therefore, patients with antibiotic exposure may be less likely to 
end up as controls in the case-control study, leading to selection bias and an 
overestimation of the effect that antibiotic exposure has on the development of MRSA 
BSI. Indeed, as in our study, the researchers observed a significant association between 
exposure to antibiotics and infections with MRSA BSI when compared with MSSA BSI 
controls but not when the non-infected control group was utilized. One of the flaws of 
this study, in addition to a small sample size, was the fact that the researchers matched 
cases and controls on age, gender, time at risk and hospital ward but did not utilize 
statistical methods appropriate for matched data. Despite this limitation, the results of the 
Ernst study are confirmed by our findings, which underscore the importance of choosing 






In a study of 60 MRSA BSI patients with 240 non-infected controls, Bakowski 
and colleagues identified severity of illness indicators and the use of central venous 
catheters as independent risk factors for MRSA BSI (20). In addition, the authors found 
prior surgery as protective against acquiring a MRSA BSI. The researchers chose an 
uninfected control group instead of a control group with methicillin-susceptible infections 
because they aimed to isolate and identify risk factors for BSI and not risk factors for 
methicillin resistance. However, the researchers observed large differences in disease 
severity between the cases and controls, which they believe masked other risk factors for 
infection. Our study identified similar results in that the comparison of MRSA BSI with 
non-infected controls identified central venous catheter use as the only independent 
encounter-based risk factor for MRSA BSI and identified ‘Major OR therapeutic 
procedure’ as a protective factor, after controlling for other demographic and clinical risk 
factors. Even after matching cases and controls on age, early ICU stay and minimum time 
at risk, important differences in underlying severity of illness seem to be present as 
evidenced by the appearance of ‘major OR therapeutic procedure’ as protective in terms 
of development of infections. A potential explanation for this observation is that those 
patients who are admitted to the hospital specifically to undergo a major therapeutic 
procedure may be healthier than those who are admitted for another reason and therefore 
may be less likely to develop MRSA BSI. This finding underscores the need for carefully 
chosen comparison groups when studying infections and the importance of careful 
consideration of the underlying differences in severity of illness between comparison 
groups, perhaps necessitating the use of more stringent matching procedures such as 






 In this study, we identified immunosuppressive medication use as a potential 
mediating risk factor, revealing the biological path through which organ transplant acts to 
increase the risk of infection. Patients who undergo transplants are at higher risk for 
developing MRSA BSI and our data suggest that exposure to immunosuppressive 
medication is a partial mediator of this relationship. Additional investigations of the 
specific relationships between demographic, clinical and encounter-based risk factors 
identified in the literature, would allow us to better understand the mechanisms that place 
patients at increased risk for MRSA BSI.  
4.6.1 Limitations 
One of the limitations of this analysis was dependence upon data available in the 
electronic medical record. Numerous studies have shown that patients colonized with S. 
aureus are at increased risk of infection, underscoring the importance of S. aureus  
carriage as an endogenous source of infection (28, 30-31). However, since this was a 
retrospective study, data on certain potential risk factors such as previous colonization 
with MRSA or MSSA were not available. Moreover, in order to utilize a data set of this 
magnitude, it was necessary to modify NHSN definitions to focus on electronically 
available data. Thus it is possible that secondary BSIs were mistakenly misclassified as 
primary BSIs and vice versa, because only microbiologic data was used to determine 
whether an infection existed at another site. Another limitation is the lack of complete 
data on antibiotic use in two of the four hospital sites for part of the study period. 
Furthermore, although this is a large study focusing on risk factors for MRSA BSI, it was 







 One of the major strengths of this analysis was the large sample size of MRSA 
and MSSA BSI, which gives sufficient power to identify pertinent risk factors. Since this 
study included all cases of MRSA and MSSA BSI in a three-year period it should not be 
subject to selection bias. Data were obtained from four hospitals which served very 
different patient populations, increasing the generalizability of the results. In addition, the 
use of two control groups allowed for the identification and comparison of risk factors for 
MRSA BSI and resistance in BSI. 
4.7 Conclusions 
We performed a case-control study to assess risk factors for MRSA BSI using two 
sets of controls; risk factors for MRSA BSI differed greatly depending on the control 
group chosen. Additionally, whether antibiotic use was included in the analysis 
influenced the results but to a lesser degree. More importantly, our results confirm the 
need for careful selection of appropriate control groups, especially when studying 
antibiotics as potential risk factors for MRSA BSI, as well as the need to carefully adjust 
for underlying severity of illness. Further research is needed to identify proper controls in 
these types of studies. Moreover, additional research to further uncover the inter-
relationships between different risk factors for MRSA BSI would aid in our 
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Table 3. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI Using Controls with MSSA 
BSI excluding antibiotic use (N= 504) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Age 0.015 0.004 1.01 1.01 – 1.02 0.001 
Hospitalization in Prior Year 0.298 0.201 1.35 0.90 – 2.00 0.138 
Charlson Severity of Illness Measure -0.056 0.041 0.95 0.87 – 1.02 0.171 
Diabetes Mellitus 0.008 0.245 1.01 0.62 – 1.63 0.975 
Renal Failure 0.457 0.210 1.58 1.05 – 2.38 0.029 
3rd Degree Burn 1.268 0.689 3.55 0.92 – 13.70 0.066 
Chemotherapy 1.138 0.715 3.12 0.77 – 12.67 0.111 
Tracheostomy 0.375 0.351 1.46 0.73 – 2.90 0.285 
Urinary Catheter Use 0.214 0.207 1.24 0.83 – 1.86 0.302 
Major Organ Transplant 1.589 0.819 4.90 0.98 – 24.37 0.052 




















Table 4. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI Using MSSA BSI Controls 
including antibiotic use (N= 330) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Age 0.011 0.006 1.01 1.00 – 1.02 0.048 
Hospitalization in Prior Year 0.322 0.253 1.38 0.84 – 2.27 0.204 
Charlson Severity of Illness 
Measure 
-0.052 0.050 0.95 0.86 – 1.05 0.302 
Diabetes Mellitus  0.050 0.302 1.05 0.58 – 1.90 0.869 
Renal Failure 0.438 0.269 1.55 0.92 – 2.63 0.104 
3rd Degree Burn 0.396 1.570 1.49 0.07 – 32.25 0.801 
Chemotherapy 1.588 1.187 4.89 0.48 – 50.10 0.181 
Tracheostomy -0.287 0.472 0.75 0.30 – 1.89 0.544 
Urinary Catheter Use 0.094 0.277 1.10 0.64 – 1.89 0.735 
Major Organ Transplant  2.639 1.097 13.99 1.63 – 120.07 0.016 
Major OR Therapeutic Procedure 0.552 0.347 1.74 0.88 – 3.43 0.112 
Monobactam Use 1.094 0.891 2.99 0.52 – 17.15 0.220 



















Table 5. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI Using Non-Infected Controls 
excluding antibiotic use (N = 595) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Male Gender 0.486 0.204 1.62 1.10 – 2.42 0.017 
Stay in Skilled Nursing Facility 0.597 0.630 1.82 0.53 – 6.25 0.343 
Hospitalization in the Prior Year 0.319 0.225 1.38 0.88 – 2.14 0.157 
Charlson Severity of Illness Measure -0.046 0.064 0.96 0.84 – 1.08 0.469 
Malignancy 0.625 0.314 1.87 1.01 – 3.46 0.047 
Renal Failure 0.995 0.248 2.71 1.66 – 4.40 <0.001 
Congestive Heart Failure 0.100 0.266 1.11 0.66 – 1.86 0.705 
Cirrhosis 1.290 0.485 3.63 1.40 – 9.40 0.008 
HIV Infection 1.511 0.692 4.53 1.17 – 17.58 0.029 
Tracheostomy 0.330 0.445 1.39 0.58 – 3.34 0.460 
Central Venous Catheter Use 0.857 0.268 2.36 1.39 – 3.98 0.001 
Major OR Therapeutic Procedure -0.449 0.220 0.64 0.41 – 0.98 0.042 
ICU Days 0.021 0.012 1.02 1.00 – 1.04 0.064 




Table 6. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI Using Non-Infected 
Controls including antibiotic use (N = 358) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Male Gender 0.451 0.269 1.57 0.93 – 2.66 0.093 
Stay in Skilled Nursing 
Facility 
0.437 0.822 1.55 0.31 – 7.76 0.595 
Hospitalization in the Prior 
Year 
0.350 0.285 1.42 0.81 – 2.48 0.220 
Charlson Severity of Illness 
Measure 
0.030 0.087 1.03 0.87 – 1.22 0.733 
Malignancy 0.345 0.458 1.41 0.58 – 3.47 0.451 
Renal Failure 1.007 0.344 2.74 1.39 – 5.38 0.003 
Congestive Heart Failure -0.198 0.341 0.82 0.42 – 1.60 0.562 
Cirrhosis 1.384 0.559 4.03 1.35 – 12/06 0.013 
HIV Infection 1.353 0.870 3.87 0.70 – 21.28 0.120 
Tracheostomy 0.666 0.832 1.95 0.38 – 9.93 0.423 
Central Venous Catheter Use 1.126 0.384 3.08 1.45 – 6.54 0.003 
Major OR Therapeutic 
Procedure 
-0.563 0.294 0.57 0.32 – 1.01 0.055 
ICU Days -0.003 0.020 1.00 0.96 – 1.04 0.866 
Immunosuppressive 
Medication 
-0.020 0.294 0.98 0.55 – 1.74 0.945 
Monobactam Use 0.711 0.980 2.03 0.30 – 13.89 0.468 

















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 Although much focus has been placed on controlling healthcare-associated 
infections (HAI) due to multi-drug resistant organisms in acute care hospitals, important 
gaps in the literature persist. Recommendations on the use of effective surveillance and 
infection control policies vary widely,5,84-86  reflecting gaps in quality of evidence on the 
effectiveness of these interventions. In addition, data on the use of these policies at the 
national level, and on the association between structural characteristics, the presence and 
implementation of these policies and rates of MDRO HAI were lacking.  
In this dissertation, I used data from two cross-sectional studies to address these 
gaps. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I used data from a national cross-sectional study to 
examine the adoption of MDRO surveillance and infection control policies in U.S. 
hospitals and to identify structural predictors of these policies. The majority of hospitals 
in this study screened for MRSA reflecting the continuing focus on this organism, while 
only a small proportion of hospitals reported screening for other MDRO. Aside from the 
widely adopted policy for isolation/contact precautions for patients with confirmed 
cultures, other infection control policies were present infrequently (42-27%), potentially 
reflecting the wide variation in published recommendations on the use of these practices. 
Not surprisingly, state mandatory reporting of infections was identified as a significant 
predictor of screening for MDRO at admission, which may reflect the hospitals’ attempt 
to identify infections not attributable to the patient’s hospital stay. An interesting inverse 
relationship between infection preventionist certification and compliance with a policy to 
cohort colonized or infected patients was also identified, which may reflect more accurate 




that these IPs may be less likely to comply with policies for which the evidence base is 
lacking.  
Although I hypothesized that infection control staffing would be an important 
structural predictor of the adoption of these policies, the only infection control staffing 
characteristic identified as an independent predictor of an infection control policy was the 
presence of a hospital epidemiologist, which was associated with a policy to screen for C. 
difficile. The lack of an observed association between infection control staffing and the 
presence and/or implementation of infection control policies may suggest that factors 
other than staffing may influence the adoption of these policies. Future studies are needed 
to explore the relationship between other structural factors that may influence adoption of 
these infection control policies, such as the hospital’s organizational climate, which has 
been shown to influence adoption of policies.8.125 In addition, this study did not explore 
how state mandatory reporting of infections impacts the work of the infection control 
department and the adaption and implementation of infection control policies; future 
studies should address this gap.  
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explored the association between structural 
characteristics, the presence, monitoring and/or implementation of screening and 
infection control policies and rates of specific MDRO in a cross-sectional study of 
California hospitals. As in the national study (described in Chapter 2), the major focus of 
infection control departments in terms of surveillance was MRSA, which is consistent 
with other published studies. 126 Although this study was conducted more than a year after 
the state of California required hospitals to target new admissions for MRSA screening, 




between legislative action and implementation of policies in the hospitals. This study did 
not explore the degree to which state and federal mandates align with the infection 
control polices of hospitals across the country nor the way in which they impact the 
activities and priorities of infection control programs. Since mandatory reporting and 
other mandates are increasing in number across the U.S., evaluations of the impact and 
effectiveness of these mandates on the role of the infection control departments and HAI 
rates in hospitals is needed.  
One important finding in this study is the use of standard culture or MRSA 
selective agar as the most frequently used method for MRSA surveillance (69%), coupled 
with the infrequent presence of a policy for contact/isolation precautions for patients with 
pending screens (34%). Since culture results with the use of these methods are available 
in 1-3 days and, in the meantime, these patients are most likely not placed on contact 
precautions and serve as a potential reservoir of transmission to other patients and 
hospital staff, the utility of screening patients at admission without concurrent placement 
of patients on contact precautions is greatly diminished.  
To my knowledge this is the first study to show a link between infection control 
certification and lower MDRO rates, controlling for other setting characteristics. 
Hospitals with an infection control director certified in infection controls were shown to 
have lower MRSA BSI rates. It is not clear whether infection control director certification 
is a marker of overall quality of the hospital, which in turn leads to lower rates or whether 
an infection control director who is certified in infection control may be more likely to 




rates. Future studies are needed to confirm these findings and further elucidate this 
relationship. 
In this study, few infection control policies were shown to be associated with 
lower MDRO rates, which may be due to an inadequate sample size to observe 
significant associations. Although power calculations conducted prior to the study 
indicated sufficient power to assess the relationship between infection control policies, 
almost half of the study hospitals did not provide infection rate data resulting in a smaller 
sample available for analysis. In addition, the data came from a cross-sectional study and 
it is unclear when the adoption of the individual surveillance control policies occurred in 
relation to the when the rate data were collected and whether the timing of the policy 
adoption had an impact on the effectiveness of the policy. To effectively answer this 
question, additional studies that collect longitudinal data on the adoption and 
implementation of these policies and rates of infections over time are needed.  
Having explored institutional predictors of MDRO infections, I then examined 
patient-level risk factors for MRSA BSI using two different control groups (controls with 
MSSA BSI and non-infected controls) to determine whether the risk factors for MRSA 
BSI would differ depending on the choice of the control group (Chapter 4). In addition, 
since previous studies using a non-infected control group were limited by great 
differences between the cases and controls in terms of severity of illness,60 which may 
have masked important risk factors, I attempted to alleviate this issue by matching cases 
and controls on early ICU stay, age and minimum period at risk. Despite the 
methodological improvements made, the results of the study largely confirmed the 




The risk factors identified differed based on the control group examined and n 
whether antibiotic exposure was included in the models. The three independent risk 
factors for MRSA BSI as compared to MSSA BSI were older age, major organ 
transplant, and quinolone use. Cases were more likely than non-infected controls to have 
renal failure, cirrhosis and a central venous catheter, after controlling for other factors. 
One of the major findings of this study is the identification of quinolone as an 
independent risk factor for MRSA BSI when compared to controls with a susceptible BSI 
but not when an uninfected control group was utilized. This confirms the findings of a 
study by Ernst and colleagues61 and underscores the importance of appropriate control 
group selection when examining antibiotic use as a potential risk factor for antibiotic 
resistant infection. Researchers conducting studies to identify risk factors for antibiotic 
resistant infections should carefully examine which control group is most appropriate to 
answer the specific question posited by the researchers.  
Immunosuppressive medication use was identified as a potential partial mediator 
of the association between major organ transplant and risk of MRSA BSI. Future studies 
should explore the specific relationships between the demographic, clinical and 
encounter-based risk factors already identified in the literature in order to describe the 
specific mechanisms that lead patients to develop MRSA BSI. Knowledge of the specific 
pathways can help to inform effective control and prevention strategies.  
 In this dissertation I explored institutional and patient-level predictors of MDRO 
HAI. I showed that MRSA remains the focus of infection control programs and that there 
is variation in the infection control policies employed in U.S. hospitals. I identified 




policies and HAI rates, although few infection control policies had an impact on HAI 
rates. Lastly, by comparing patients with MRSA BSI with two sets of controls, I 
confirmed the need for careful selection of appropriate control groups in studies of 
individual level risk factors for antibiotic resistant HAI. Longitudinal studies are needed 
to further elucidate the relationship between setting characteristics, infection control 
policies and HAI rates. Additional studies of individual level risk factors should be 
conducted to further examine the interrelationships between different clinical and 
encounter-based factors to provide a clear description for the mechanisms through which 
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Appendix 6.1.11. Relevant Sections of Questionnaire Used in Aim I 
Survey Sections 
I: HOSPITAL AND RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
II: INFECTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT STAFF 
III: INFECTION CONTROL PROFESSIONAL TIME& 
IV: ORGANIZATION & SUPPORT FOR INFECTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT 
V: ICU SPECIFIC POLICIES 
VI: HOSPITAL-WIDE INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
VII: REPORTING OF INFECTIONS 
VIII: PHASE II interest 
 
I: HOSPITAL AND RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Facility Name: _____________________________________________________ 
Facility Mailing Address: ___________________________________________ 




Zip Code: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Please provide one of the identifiers below or check "Don't know" if you do not have this 
information: 
American Hospital Association ID#: ________________________ 
CMS Provider #:____________________________________________ 
 
How long has your hospital been part of the CDC Network (National Healthcare Safety Network 
(NHSN) and/or NNIS)? 
___ Less than 1 year ___ 1-3 years ___ More than 3 years 
 
What is your ethnic background?  
___ Asian-Pacific Islander  ___ Native American ___ Latino  ___  African-American (non-Latino 
origin)  ___  Caucasian (non-Latino origin) 
 
What is your highest educational level?  
___ Diploma ___ 1 year technical  __ Associate degree ___  Bachelors degree ___  
Masters degree  ___ PhD  __  MD 
 
II: INFECTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT STAFF 
Does your hospital have an Infection Control Director position? 
1 – No  2 – Yes   
Please indicate the total number of hours the Infection Control Director actually works (including 
overtime) for the Infection Control Department each week.__________________________ 
  
Is the Infection Control Director certified in infection control (CIC)? 
 
For the Infection Control Director, what is the highest qualification attained? 
  ___ MD with infectious disease specialty ___ MD without infectious disease specialty  
 ___ RN with graduate degree (e.g., MPH, MSN)  ___  RN without graduate degree  
 ___ LPN      ___  Masters in Epidemiology, non-nurse  
 ___ Med Tech     ___ Other   ___ 
DON’T KNOW 
If Other, please specify: ________________ 
 





For the Infection Control Director, is this person a member of SHEA or APIC? 1 – No 
 2 – Yes  3 – DK 
To whom does the Infection Control Director report? (Check all that apply). 
___  Medical Director 
___  Nursing Director 
___  Quality Mgt Director 
       Other  _______________  
 
Please indicate the number of Hospital Epidemiologists, other than the Infection Control Director 
at your hospital. _________ 
 
Please indicate the number of Infection Control Professionals (ICPs), other than the Infection 
Control Director and Hospital Epidemiologists at your hospital. ____________ 
 
Does your department have help with data management? 1 – No 2 – Yes 3 – DK  
 If yes, how many hours? ______ 
Does your department have help with secretarial functions? 1 – No     2 – Yes     3 – DK 
 If yes, how many hours? ______ 
Does your department have other help (e.g., statistician or operations manager)?  
 1 – No 2 – Yes 3 – DK If yes, how many hours? ______ 
 
What is your role in the Infection Control Department? 
  ___ Infection control department Director/Coordinator  
 ___ Hospital epidemiologist, other than Director/Coordinator 
 ___ ID Physician, other than Director/Coordinator/Hospital Epide  
 ___  ICP other than Director/Coordinator 
 ___  Data Analyst/Manager      
___  Administrative Assistant/Secretary  ___  Other 
 
Infection Control Professional or Hospital Epidemiologist – individual staff information 
Please indicate the total number of hours that this Infection Control Professional/ Hospital 
Epidemiologist actually works (including overtime) for the Infection Control Department each 
week. 
 
Is this ICP/HE certified in infection control (CIC)? 1 – No  2 – Yes  3 – DK 
For this ICP/HE, what is the highest qualification attained? 
 ___ MD with infectious disease specialty ___  MD without infectious disease specialty 
 ___  RN with graduate degree (e.g., MPH, MSN) ___  RN without graduate degree 
 ___  LPN     ___  Masters in Epidemiology, non-nurse 
 ___ Med Tech    ___ Other  ___  DON’T KNOW 
 
For this ICP/HE, how many years experience does he/she have? 
 ___   less than 2 years  ___ 2-5 years   ___ 6-10 years 
 ___  11-15 years   ___  more than 15 years  ___ DON’T KNOW 
 
For this ICP/HE, is this person a member of SHEA or APIC? 1 – No 2 – Yes 3 – DK 
IV: ORGANIZATION & SUPPORT FOR INFECTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT 
The following questions are about the institutional organization and support for the department. 
For each item in the following section, please indicate which answer best represents your work 
environment. 
 
1 – Never  2 – Rarely 3 – Sometimes  4 - Most of the time  5 - Always 





___  The Hospital Epidemiologist or the Director of the Infection Control Department has the 
authority to close beds in the event of an outbreak. 
___  My hospital or department funds continuing education activities for Infection Control staff. 
___  I have access to key decision makers in my hospitals if I have a problem. 
___  Does your institution use an electronic surveillance system for tracking Healthcare 
Associated Infections? 
 
If yes, what system does it use? (Check all that apply). 
___  Custom system developed at the hospital 
___  AICE 
___  MedMined 
___  Theradoc 
___  SafetySurveillor 
        Other _______________  
 
VII: REPORTING OF INFECTIONS 
Screening of Organisms 
Does this ICU routinely screen for the following organisms? Please check all that apply. 
a. MRSA 
b. VRE 
c. C. difficile 
d. Multi-drug resistant GNRs 
e. Other ____________  
f. Does not screen for any MDRO 
 
Policies and Interventions:  Multi-Drug Resistant Organisms (MDROs)  
Please mark whether in this ICU the following policies/measures are implemented. 
 
1 – No  2 – Yes  3 – DON’T KNOW 
 1 - All of the time (95-100%)  2 - Usually (75-94%) 3 - Sometimes (25-74%)   
 4 - Rarely/Never (less than 25%) 5 – DON’T KNOW 
 
Does your ICU have a written policy in place to screen ALL patients for MDROs upon ICU 
admission?  
If yes, does your ICU monitor whether ALL patients are screened for MDROs upon ICU 
admission? 
If yes, please estimate the proportion of patients that are screened for MDROs upon ICU 
admission: 
 
Does your ICU have a written policy in place to screen patients for MDROs periodically after ICU 
admission? 
If yes, does your ICU monitor whether patients are screened for MDROs periodically after ICU 
admission? 
If yes, please estimate the proportion of time that patients are screened for MDROs periodically 
after ICU admission: 
 
Does your ICU have a written policy in place to implement presumptive isolation/contact 
precautions pending a MDRO screen? 
If yes, does your ICU monitor whether presumptive isolation/contact precautions are implemented 
pending a MDRO screen? 
If yes, please estimate the proportion of time that presumptive isolation/contact precautions are 
implemented pending a MDRO screen: 
 
Does your ICU have a written policy in place to implement contact precautions for patients with 




If yes, does your ICU monitor whether contact precautions are implemented for patients with 
positive cultures for MDROs? 
If yes, please estimate the proportion of time that contact precautions are implemented for 
patients with positive cultures for MDROs: 
 
Does your ICU have a written policy in place to cohort infected patients with MDROs in the same 
room? 
If yes, does your ICU track whether patients infected with MDROs are cohorted in the same 
room? 
If yes, please estimate the proportion of patients infected with MDROs that are cohorted in the 
same room: 
 
Does your ICU have a written policy in place to cohort patients colonized with MDROs in the 
same room? 
If yes, does your ICU track whether patients colonized with MDROs are cohorted in the same 
room? 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.2.2. Infection Rates by Different Hospital Characteristics and Infection Control 
Policies 
 MRSA BSI Rate 
(N = 91) 
VRE BSI Rate 
(N = 91) 
C. Difficile Infection 
Rate (N = 105) 
 Median (Interquartile range) 
Teaching 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.31) 0 (0 – 0.42) 0.49 (0.29 – 0.56) 
No 0 (0 – 0.35) 0 (0 – 0.09) 0.37 (0 – 0.75) 
Region    
Urban 0 (0 – 0.41) 0 (0 – 0.42) 0.53 (0.25 – 0.91) 
Suburban 0 (0 – 0.59) 0 (0 – 0.18) 0.49 (0.17 – 0.71) 
Rural 0 (0 – 0) 0 (0 – 0) 0 (0 – 0.28) 
Presence of Hospital Epidemiologist 
Any  0 (0 – 0.06) 0 (0 – 0.41) 0.43 (0.19 – 0.71) 
None 0 (0 – 0.04) 0 (0 – 0.18) 0.38 (0 – 0.78) 
Participation in CHAIPI 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.09) 0 (0 – 0.19) 0.49 (0.11 – 0.64) 
No 0 (0 – 0.41) 0 (0 – 0.17) 0.41 (0.12 – 0.75) 
Participation in CHART 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.42) 0 (0 – 0.14) 0.15 (0.49 – 0.74) 
No 0 (0 – 0.34) 0 (0 – 0.44) 0.37 (0 – 0.73) 
Participation in IHI 
Yes 0 (0 – 0) 0 (0 – 0.19) 0.41 (0 – 0.70) 
No 0 (0 – 0.57) 0 (0 – 0.15) 0.52 (0.18 – 0.79) 
Participation in Other Initiative 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.42) 0 (0 – 0.09) 0.49 (0.15 – 0.71) 
No 0 (0 – 0.31) 0 (0 – 0.23) 0.41 (0.11 – 0.75) 
Participation in Any Initiative 
0 (0 – 0.34) 0 (0 – 0.93) 0.41 (0.12 – 0.74) 
0 (0 – 0.62) 0 (0 – 0.15) 0.47 (0.11 – 0.96) 
Infection Control Director Certified in Infection Control 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.42) 0 (0 – 0.21) 0.51 (0.35 – 0.68) 
No 0 (0 – 0.15) 0 (0 – 0.03) 0.23 (0 – 0.61) 
Infection Control Director member of SHEA/APIC 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.41) 0 (0 – 0.21) 0.43 (0.15 – 0.74) 
No 0 (0 – 0.15) 0 (0 – 0.03) 0.14 (0 – 0.67) 
Electronic Surveillance System 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.74) 0 (0 – 0.21) 0.49 (0.31 – 0.74) 
No 0 (0 – 0) 0 (0 – 0.14) 0.36 (0 – 0.74) 
Screen All Patients Upon Admission* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.44) -- -- 
No 0 (0 – 0) -- -- 
Target New Admissions for Screening* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.34) 0 .31 (0.17 – 1.10) 0.11 (0 – 0.52) 
No 0.10 (0 – 0.75) 0 (0 – 0.15) 0.42 (0.12 – 0.74) 
Screen All Patients Periodically After Admission* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0) -- -- 












Screen Select Patients Periodically After Admission* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.15) -- -- 
No 0 (0 – 0.44) -- -- 
Implement Presumptive Isolation/Contact Precautions Pending A Screen* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.21) 0 (0 – 0) 0.37 (0.15 – 0.68) 
No 0 (0 – 0.35) 0 (0 – 0.18) 0.51 (0 – 0.78) 
Implement Contact Precautions for Patients with Positive Cultures* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.35) 0 (0 – 0.22) 0.42 (0.15 – 0.74) 
No 0 (0 – 0) 0 (0 – 0) 0.17 (0 – 0.78) 
Conduct Surveillance of Microbiology Results for New Cases* 
Yes 0 (0 – 0.51) 0 (0 – 0.18) 0.46 (0.15 – 0.73) 
No 0 (0 – 0) 0 (0 – 0.21) 0.35 (0 – 0.78) 
Promote the use of soap and water after caring for patients with C. difficile-associated diarrhea 
Yes -- -- 0.41 (0.12 – 0.73) 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.2.4. Relationship Between Infection Control Policies and MRSA BSI Rates, 
Bivariate Analysis Using Negative Binomial Regression  
Coef  p-value  IRR 95% CI 
Screening all patients for MRSA upon admission  0.48 0.361 1.61 0.58 - 4.47 
Target new admissions for MRSA screening  -0.49 0.444 0.61 0.18 - 2.15 
Screen all patients for MRSA periodically after 
admission  -- -- -- -- 
Screen select patients for MRSA periodically 
after admission  -1.46 0.140 0.23 0.30 - 1.62 
Implement presumptive isolation/ contact 
precautions pending a MRSA screen  0.36 0.466 1.43 0.54 - 3.78 
Implement contact precautions for patients with 
positive cultures -0.50 0.570 0.61 0.11 - 3.41 
Perform surveillance of micro results for new 
cases of MRSA 2.30 0.049 10.02 1.01 - 99.27 
 
 
Table 6.2.5. Relationship Between Infection Control Policies and VRE BSI Rates, 
Bivariate Analysis Using Poisson Regression  
Coef p-value IRR 95% CI 
Screening all patients for VRE upon admission  -- -- -- -- 
Target new admissions for VRE screening  1.20 0.076 3.31 0.88 - 12.40 
Screen all patients for VRE periodically after 
admission  -- -- -- -- 
Screen select patients for VRE periodically after 
admission  -- -- -- -- 
Implement presumptive isolation/ contact 
precautions pending a VRE screen  
-
1.23 0.411 0.29 0.02 - 5.52 
Implement contact precautions for patients with 
positive cultures 0.69 0.285 2.00 0.56 - 7.14 
Perform surveillance of micro results for new 
cases of VRE 
-











Table 6.2.6. Relationship Between Infection Control Policies and C. difficile Rates, 
Bivariate Analysis Using Poisson Regression  
Coef p-value IRR 95% CI 
Screening all patients for C. difficile upon 
admission  -- -- -- -- 
Target new admissions for C. difficile screening  -- -- -- -- 
Screen all patients for C. difficile periodically after 
admission  -- -- -- -- 
Screen select patients for C. difficile periodically 
after admission  -- -- -- -- 
Implement presumptive precautions pending a 
screen  -0.20 0.465 0.82 0.47 - 1.41 
Implement precautions for patients with positive 
cultures 0.07 0.886 1.07 0.43 - 2.63 
Surveillance of microbiology results for new cases -0.07 0.817 0.93 0.51 - 1.71 
Promote the use of soap and water -0.04 0.910 0.96 0.46 - 2.01 
 
 
Table 6.2.7. Effect of Full Compliance with MRSA BSI Policies on MRSA BSI Rate per 100 
Central Line Days in Bivariate Analysis† (All of the Time vs. Other) 
 Coef S.E. p-value IRR 95% CI 
Screening all patients for MRSA upon 
admission  0.38 0.83 0.65 1.46 0.29 – 7.45 
Target new admissions for MRSA screening -1.33 0.89 0.14 0.26 0.05 -1.52 
Screen all patients for MRSA periodically 
after admission  -- -- -- -- -- 
Screen select patients for MRSA 
periodically after admission  -- -- -- -- -- 
Implement presumptive isolation/contact 
precautions pending a MRSA screen  -0.90 1.37 0.51 0.41 0.03 – 5.97 
Implement contact precautions for patients 
with positive MRSA cultures -0.95 0.71 0.18 0.39 0.10 – 1.54 
Perform surveillance of microbiology 
results for new cases of MRSA 0.48 0.81 0.55 1.62 0.33 – 8.01 
 





Table 6.2.8. Predictors of MRSA BSI Rate per 1000 Central Line Days in Bivariate Poisson 
Analysis† 
 Coef S.E. p-value 
Setting Characteristics    
Setting (reference group = urban)    
Suburb 0.50 0.59 0.40 
Rural 0.75 1.09 0.49 
Participation in CHAIPI 0.27 0.61 0.65 
Participation in CHART -0.87 0.51 0.09 
Participation in IHI -1.21 0.56 0.03 
Participation in other initiative 0.74 0.54 0.17 
Participation in any initiative -0.47 0.66 0.45 
ICD hours 0.02 0.02 0.33 
ICD certified in infection control  -1.14 0.50 0.02 
ICD member of SHEA/APIC 1.21 1.79 0.50 
ESS 0.55 0.59 0.36 
Presence of Hospital Epidemiologist*  0.30 0.62 0.63 
Presence of full-time Hospital Epidemiologist -0.55 2.56 0.83 
# of Hospital Epidemiologists* 0.06 0.49 0.90 
Hospital Epidemiologist hours 0.01 0.02 0.59 
# of Infection Preventionists -0.13 -0.26 0.61 
Total Infection Preventionist hours -0.01 0.01 0.49 
Proportion of Infection Preventionists certified in 
infection control  0.45 0.68 0.51 
# of FTE IP per 100 beds -- -- -- 
Total infection control hours (IP + Director) -0.01 0.01 0.78 
MRSA Infection Control Policies    
Screen all patients for MRSA upon admission  0.48 0.60 0.43 
Target new admissions for MRSA screening -0.49 0.72 0.50 
Screen all new patients for MRSA periodically after 
admission  -- -- -- 
Target MRSA screening periodically after admission -1.46 1.48 0.32 
Implement presumptive isolation/contact 
precautions pending a MRSA screen 0.36 0.57 0.53 
Implement contact precautions for patients with 
positive cultures -0.50 0.97 0.61 
Perform surveillance of microbiology results for 
new cases of MRSA 2.30 1.82 0.21 
 










Table 6.2.9. Predictors of MRSA BSI Rate per 1,000 Central Line Days in Multivariable 
Poisson Regression 
 Coef S.E. P-value 
Model 1    
Screen all patients for MRSA upon admission 2.33 0.91 0.10 
Infection Control Director hours 0.09 0.05 0.06 
Infection Control Director certified in infection control  -2.01 0.72 0.01 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -3.71 0.65 0.04 
Participation in IHI -0.74 0.07 0.25 
Model 2    
Target new admissions for MRSA screening -3.51 0.95 <0.01 
Infection Control Director hours 0.08 0.04 0.06 
Infection Control Director certified in infection control  -2.29 0.48 <0.01 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -2.17 0.91 0.02 
Participation in CHART 0.89 0.66 0.18 
Model 3    
Screen select patients for MRSA periodically after 
admission -1.07 0.75 0.15 
Infection Control Director hours 0.05 0.03 0.10 
Infection Control Director certified in infection control  -1.21 0.52 0.02 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -1.43 1.06 0.18 
Participation in IHI -0.73 0.53 0.18 
Model 4    
Implement presumptive isolation/contact precautions 
pending a MRSA screen -0.16 0.69 0.82 
Infection Control Director hours 0.05 0.03 0.15 
Infection Control Director certified in infection control  -1.35 0.60 0.03 
# of IP FTE per 100 beds -1.60 1.24 0.20 










Appendix 6.2.10. Relevant Sections of California Survey used in Aim II 
  
Survey Sections 
I: HOSPITAL AND RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
II: INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL DEPARTMENT STAFF 
III: IP STAFF TIME USE and PROGRAMS AFFECTING DEPTARTMENT 
V: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 
VII: POLICIES ON INFECTIOUS AGENTS 
 
I: HOSPITAL AND RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS  
 
What is your role in the Infection Prevention and Control Department ? 
1– Infection Prevention and Control Department Director/Coordinator 
2– Physician hospital epidemiologist, other than Director/Coordinator 
3– Physician with infectious disease specialty, other than Director/ Coordinator/ Hospital 
epidemiologist 
4– IP other than Director/Coordinator 
5– Data Analyst/Manager 
6– Administrative Assistant/Secretary 
7– Other (txt) 
 
Is your hospital a teaching hospital? ?  1 – yes, 0 – no 
How would you describe the hospital setting at which you practice? 
1 – Urban setting / Large city more than 200,000 
2  – Suburb / medium sized town  
3 – Rural setting/ town less than 50,000  
 
 Is your hospital participating in any of the following programs? (check all that apply)  
1....Yes, 0....No 
_____ California Hospital Assessment and Reporting Task Force  
_____ Five Million Lives Campaign  
_____  other  
  
How many licensed bed does your hospital have, not including long term care or rehab facilities? 
 
Does your infection control program provide service to outpatient clinics?  
 1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK 
Does your infection control program provide service to long term care facilities?  
1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK   If yes, how many beds? 
 
Does your infection control program provide service to rehab facilities? 1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK  
If yes, how many beds?  
 
II: INFECTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT STAFF  
Please answer these questions based on the personnel resources available at this time in your 
infection control department. There will be separate questions about the Infection Control 
Director, Hospital Epidemiologists, Infection Preventionists, and support staff. 
 





Does your hospital have an Infection Control Director position (include yourself)? 1 – yes, 0 – no, 
3 – DK 
 
Please indicate the total number of hours the Infection Control Director actually works (including 
overtime) for the Infection Control Department each week.  
 
Please answer the following questions for the Infection Control Director or, if there is no director, 
the person who oversees the day-to-day operations of the infection control department 
 
Is he/she certified in infection control (CIC)? 1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK 
 
Is this person a member of SHEA or APIC?   1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK 
 
 Is he/she on the local Infection Control Committee? 
1=Chair/Cochair, 2=Participant, 3=Not on committee, 4=No committee 
 
HOSPITAL  EPIDEMIOLOGISTS / INFECTION PREVENTIONISTS 
 
Please indicate the number of Hospital Epidemiologists (MD only), other than the department 
Director/ manager entered above (enter whole numbers only, including part time staff )  
If your hospital epidemiologist is not a physician, please consider that person an infection 
preventionist for the purposes of this survey. 
 
Please indicate the number of Infection Preventionists (IPs), other than the Infection Control 
Director and Hospital Epidemiologist entered above.  (enter whole numbers only, including part 
time staff ) ____________ 
 
OTHER STAFFING  
 
Does your department have help with data management? 1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK 
If yes, how many hours?  
 
Does your department have help with secretarial functions? 1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK 
If yes, how many hours?  
 
Does your department have other help (e.g., statistician or operations manager)?  
1 – yes, 0 – no, 3 – DK   If yes, how many hours?  
 
V: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (ESS) 
 
___ Does your institution use an electronic surveillance system for tracking healthcare associated 
infections? 1....Yes  0....No 3 .. DK 
If yes, when did your hospital begin using this surveillance system? ______________ 
 
We have and utilize the following features (1....Yes  0....No 3 .. DK) 
________ Data mining (system is integrated with clinical, laboratory, and pharmacy 
 ________ Automatic alerts 
 ________ Use built-in templates to create reports and data summaries 
 ________ Integration of infection data with CDC definitions and/ or reporting requirements 





 Total number of hours per day the surveillance system is used by all IP staff _______ 
 
 VII: POLICIES ON INFECTIOUS AGENTS (Hospital Wide Policies) 
These questions pertain to hospital policies and are not specific to the ICU described in the 
previous section. 
 
Does your hospital collect a surveillance culture upon admission for any group of patients? 
0 = no  1 = yes   3 = don’t know   
If yes, for which patients? 
0 = no 1 = yes   
 All admissions (excluding L&D) 
 Readmissions within 30 days of discharge 
Transfers from nursing homes 
ICU patients 
Dialysis patients 
Other  _________ (txt) 
 
Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) (Hospital wide surveillance) 
For Jan – March 2010 
 
 
 Does your 
hospital have a 
written policy to:  
0 = no  
1 = yes   
3 = dk 
 
During the last period 
monitored, what proportion of 
time was this policy was 
correctly implemented? 
1 - All of the time (95-100%)  
2 - Usually (75-94%)  
3 - Sometimes (25-74%)   
4 - Rarely/Never (less than 
25%) 
5 - We monitor 
implementation but don't 
know the proportion 
6  - No Monitoring 
Screen all patients for MRSA upon admission?   
Target new admissions for MRSA screening? 
(e.g., readmissions, transfers from nursing 
homes, ICU patients, etc) 
  
*drop down*    If you target new admissions, which populations do you target? Check all that apply. 
Readmissions within 30 days of discharge 
Transfers from skilled nursing facilities/long term health care 
 ICU patients 
 Dialysis patients 
Surgical patients with documented medical conditions that make them susceptible to infection 
Other, specify: _____________________________________ (txt) 
Screen all patients for MRSA periodically after 
admission? 
  
Screen select patients for MRSA periodically after 
admission?  
  
*drop down*      If you screen select patients for MRSA periodically after admission, which 






Other, specify: _______________________________________ (txt) 
Implement presumptive isolation/contact 
precautions pending a MRSA screen? 
  
Implement contact precautions for patients with 
positive cultures for MRSA? 
  
Perform surveillance of microbiology results for 
new cases of MRSA? 
  
If your hospital collects surveillance culture for MRSA, which method is used?  
 (Check all that apply).  
Standard culture 
PCR or other rapid diagnostics 
MRSA Selective agar (e.g. CHROMager) 
Other 
Other, specify: _______________________________________________  (txt) 
Do not collect surveillance cultures 
What other activities does your hospital use to decrease MRSA?_____________________________ 
 
 
Clostridium difficile hospital wide surveillance 
Is your hospital involved in any activities to decrease healthcare associated C. difficile-associated 
infections? 0 = no 1 = yes  3 = dk 
Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) infections  
Hospital wide surveillance 
Is your hospital involved in any activities to decrease healthcare associated Vancomycin-resistant 
Enterococci (VRE) infections?  0 = no 1 = yes  3 = dk 
 
*drop down* If yes, please check which activities your hospital is involved in to decrease VRE: 
(Check all that apply).  
Screen ALL new patients for VRE upon admission 
 Screen select patients for VRE upon admission (e.g., readmissions, transfers, ICU patients) 
Screen all patients for VRE periodically after ICU admission 
Screen select patients for VRE periodically after ICU admission 
Implement presumptive isolation/ contact precautions pending a screen 
Implement contact precautions for patients with positive cultures 
Surveillance of microbiology results for new cases 
Other, specify: ____________________________________________________ (txt) 
*drop down *    If your hospital screens select patients for VRE upon admission, which 
populations are screened?  
Readmissions within 30 days of discharge 
Transfers from nursing homes/long term healthcare facilities 
 ICU patients 
 Dialysis patients 
Other, specify: ____________________________________________ (txt) 
*drop down *    If your hospital screens select patients for VRE periodically after admissions, 
which populations are screened?  
ICU  
Dialysis 




*drop down *    If yes, please check which activities your hospital is involved in to decrease C. 
difficile: (Check all that apply).  
 Screen ALL new patients upon admission 
 Screen select patients upon admission (e.g., readmissions, transfers from nursing homes) 
 Screen all patients periodically after ICU admission 
 Screen select patients periodically after ICU admission 
 Implement presumptive isolation/ contact precautions pending a screen 
 Implement contact precautions for patients with positive cultures 
 Surveillance of microbiology results for new cases 
 Promote the use of soap and water after caring for patients with C. difficile associated diarrhea 
 Other, specify: _____________________(txt) 
*drop down *    If your hospital screens select patients for C. difficile upon admission, which 
populations are screened?  
 Readmissions within 30 days of discharge 
 Transfers from nursing homes/long term healthcare facilities 
 ICU patients 
 Dialysis patients 
 Other, specify: ________________________________________________ (txt) 
*drop down *    If your hospital screens select patients for C. difficile periodically after 
admissions, which populations are screened?  
 ICU  
Dialysis 
Other 
 Other, specify: ________________________________________________ (txt) 
 
Do you routinely screen for any other organism(s)? 0 = no 1 = yes  3 = dk 
 
If yes, please specify which organism(s) your hospital routinely screens for (other than MRSA, 
VRE and C. difficile): (txt)____________________________________________ 
 
Does your hospital have a policy regarding antibiotic restriction? 0 = no 1 = yes  3 = dk 
 
If yes, please describe the policy:  (txt)___________________________________ 
 
Please report the following:  1st quarter of 2010 (Jan – March) 
 1 -Don’t monitor  
2 -Prefer not to answer 
3-Do not have ICU level data 
Total number of hospital admissions    
Total number of inpatient days   
Total number of central line days (hospital-wide)  
Number of health-care-associated MRSA -Blood 
Stream Infections (hospital-wide)  
 
Number of health-care-associated VRE -Blood 
Stream Infections (hospital-wide)  
 








6.3  Appendix 3: Chapter 4 Appendix 
 




 Gentamicin Sulfate 
 Tobramycin Sulfate 
 
Carbapenems  
 Imipenem Cilastatin 
 Meropenem 
 












 Cefuroxime Axetil 



















 Amoxicillin Clavulante 
Amoxicillin 
 Ampicillin Sodium 
 Ampicillin Sulbactam 
 Dicloxacillin Sodium 
 Oxacillin 
 Penicillin G Benzathine 
 Penicillin G Potassium 
 Penicillin G Procaine 
 Penicillin G Sodium 
 Penicillin V Potassium 
 Pipercillin Tazobactam  
 
Polypeptides 








 Doxycycline Calcium 
 Doxycyline Hyclate 
 Minocycline HCL 































































































































Table 6.3.3. Matched Comparison of MRSA BSI Cases and Non-infected Controls Using 
Mantel-Haenszel Methods  





 N (%) N (%) MH OR 95% CI p-value 
Gender 
Female 83 (41.3) 207 (51.5) 
1.55 1.08 – 2.26 0.015 
Male 118 (58.7) 195 (48.5) 
Stay in skilled nursing facility 
Yes 9 (4.5) 8 (2.0) 2.43 0.91 – 6.50 0.068 
No 192 (95.5) 394 (98.0) 
Prior Hospitalization 
Yes 91 (45.3) 140 (34.8) 1.68 1.14 – 2.46 0.007 
No 110 (54.7) 262 (65.2) 
Diabetes 
Yes 51 (25.4) 82 (20.4) 1.34 0.89 – 2.03 0.156 
 No 150 (74.6) 320 (79.6) 
Any Burn 
Yes 6 (3.0) 16 (4.0) 0.69 0.24 – 1.99 0.493 
No 195 (97.0) 386 (96.0) 
Burns of >10% of body 
Yes 3 (1.5) 7 (1.7) 0.83 0.20 – 3.49 0.803 
No 198 (98.5) 395 (98.3) 
3rd degree burns 
Yes 6 (3.0) 9 (2.2) 1.43 0.45 – 4.50 0.540 
No 195 (97.0) 393 (97.8) 
Renal failure 
Yes 99 (49.3) 115 (28.6) 3.02 1.99 – 4.59 <0.001 
No 102 (50.8) 287 (71.4) 
Open wound 
Yes 2 (1.0) 3 (0.8) 1.33 0.22 – 7.98 0.752 
No 199 (99.0) 399 (99.3) 
Malignancy 
Yes 52 (25.9) 73 (18.2) 1.65 1.08 – 2.50 0.019 
No 149 (74.1) 329 (81.8) 
Chronic dermatitis 
Yes 27 (13.4) 38 (9.5) 1.47 0.87 – 2.49 0.148 
No 174 (86.6) 364 (90.6) 
History of major organ transplant 
Yes 8 (4.0) 14 (3.5) 1.14 0.48 – 2.72  0.763 
No 193 (96.0) 388 (96.5) 




Yes 20 (10.0) 36 (9.0) 1.14 0.62 – 2.11 0.670 
No 181 (90.0) 366 (91.0) 
Intubation 
Yes 35 (17.4) 65 (16.4) 1.10 0.67 – 1.82 0.696 
No 166 (82.6) 332 (83.6) 
Mechanical ventilation during encounter 
Yes 43 (21.4) 71 (17.9) 1.39 0.84 – 2.31 0.200 
No 158 (78.6) 326 (82.1) 
Insertion of feeding tube 
Yes 10 (5.0) 22 (5.5) 0.87 0.39 – 1.95 0.739 
No 191 (95.0) 375 (94.5) 
Any Cardiac Procedure  
Yes 24 (12.0) 60 (15.4) 0.72 0.41 – 1.23 0.225 
No 176 (88.0) 330 (84.6) 
Biopsy performed 
Yes 11 (5.5) 21 (5.3) 1.05 0.49 – 2.26 0.900 
No 190 (94.5) 376 (94.7) 
Dialysis performed 
Yes 22 (11.0) 30 (7.6) 1.52 0.84 – 2.75 0.164 
No 179 (89.0) 367 (92.4) 
Major organ transplant performed 
Yes 8 (4.0) 10 (2.5) 1.60 0.63 – 4.05 0.317 
No 193 (96.0) 387 (97.5) 
Major or diagnostic procedures performed in encounter as per HCUP classification 
Yes 8 (4.0) 21 (5.3) 0.76 0.34 – 1.72 0.512 
No 193 (96.0) 376 (94.7) 
Major or therapeutic procedure performed in encounter as per HCUP classification 
Yes 52 (25.8) 147 (37.1) 0.56 0.37 – 0.84 0.005 
No 149 (74.1) 249 (62.9) 
Central venous catheter inserted   
Yes 81 (40.3) 106 (26.6) 2.41 1.55 – 3.75 <0.001 
No 120 (59.7) 292 (73.4) 
Asthma 
Yes 15 (7.5) 26 (6.5) 
1.18 0.60 – 2.32 0.628 
No 186 (92.5) 376 (93.5) 
Chemotherapy 
Yes 7  (3.5) 7 (1.7) 
2.00 0.70 – 5.70 0.186 
No 194 (96.5) 395 (98.3) 
Congestive Heart Failure 
Yes 50 (24.9) 74 (18.4) 
1.54 0.99 – 2.40 0.053 





Yes 15 (7.5) 11 (2.7) 
3.11 1.32 – 7.32 0.006 
No 186 (92.5) 391 (97.3) 
COPD 
Yes 11 (5.5) 25 (6.2) 
0.88 0.44 – 1.77 0.720 
No 190 (94.5) 377 (93.8) 
Decubitus Ulcers 
Yes 13 (6.5) 19 (4.7) 
1.44 0.67 – 3.09 0.350 
No 188 (93.5) 383 (95.3) 
Hepatitis B 
Yes 1 (0.5) 4 (1.0) 
0.50 0.06 – 4.47 0.527 
No 200 (99.5) 398 (99.0) 
Hepatitis C 
Yes 7 (3.5) 9 (2.2) 
1.56 0.58 – 4.18 0.377 
No 194 (96.5) 393 (97.8) 
HIV 
Yes 11 (5.5) 11 (2.7) 
2.57 0.93 – 7.12 0.059 
No 190 (94.5) 391 (97.3) 
Neurological Disease 
Yes 12 (6.0) 16 (4.0) 
1.67 0.69 – 4.00 0.248 
No 189 (94.0) 386 (96.0) 
Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Yes 2 (1.0) 1 (0.3) 
4.00 0.36 – 44.11 0.221 
No 199 (99.0) 401 (99.8) 
Tracheostomy 
Yes 23 (11.4) 28 (7.0) 
2.29 1.10 – 4.74 0.022 























Table 6.3.4. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI Using Controls with MSSA 
BSI Using Catheter Days (Excluding Antibiotic Use)  
 Β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Age 0.015 0.004 1.02 1.01 – 1.02 <0.001 
Hospitalization in Prior Year 0.288 0.201 1.33 0.90 – 1.98 0.153 
Charlson Severity of Illness Measure -0.057 0.041 0.94 0.87 – 1.02 0.168 
Diabetes Mellitus 0.004 0.246 1.00 0.62 – 1.61 0.988 
Renal Failure 0.446 0.210 1.56 1.04 – 2.36 0.033 
3rd Degree Burn 1.258 0.702 3.52 0.89 – 13.93 0.073 
Chemotherapy 1.114 0.712 3.05 0.75 – 12.30 0.118 
Tracheostomy 0.251 0.375 1.29 0.62 – 2.68 0.503 
Urinary Catheter Days 0.011 0.008 1.01 0.99 – 1.03 0.197 
Major Organ Transplant 1.611 0.818 5.01 1.01 – 24.86 0.049 




















Table 6.3.5. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI Using Controls with MSSA 
BSI Using Catheter Days (Including Antibiotic Use) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Age 0.012 0.005 1.01 1.00 – 1.02 0.026 
Hospitalization in Prior Year 0.316 0.254 1.37 0.84 – 2.26 0.212 
Charlson Severity of Illness Measure -0.053 0.050 0.95 0.86 – 1.05 0.294 
Diabetes Mellitus  0.042 0.302 1.04 0.58 – 1.88 0.890 
Renal Failure 0.457 0.270 1.58 0.93 – 2.68 0.090 
3rd Degree Burn 0.640 1.557 1.90 0.09 – 40.11 0.681 
Chemotherapy 1.531 1.181 4.62 0.46 – 46.81 0.195 
Tracheostomy -0.186 0.493 0.83 0.32 – 2.18 0.705 
Urinary Catheter Days 0.006 0.010 0.99 0.97 – 1.01 0.569 
Major Organ Transplant  2.766 1.109 15.90 1.81 – 139.70 0.013 
Major OR Therapeutic Procedure 0.626 0.338 1.87 0.96 – 3.63 0.064 
Monobactam Use 1.085 0.884 2.96 0.52 – 16.74 0.220 



















Table 6.3.6. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI vs. Non-Infected Controls 
Using Catheter Days (Excluding Antibiotic Use) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Male Gender 0.446 0.201 1.56 1.95 – 2.32 0.027 
Stay in Skilled Nursing Facility 0.382 0.643 1.47 0.42 – 5.17 0.552 
Hospitalization in the Prior Year 0.325 0.223 1.38 0.89 – 2.15 0.145 
Charlson Severity of Illness Measure -0.061 0.063 0.94 0.83 – 1.06 0.331 
Malignancy 0.680 0.308 1.97 1.08 – 3.61 0.027 
Renal Failure 1.001 0.245 2.72 1.68 – 4.40 <0.001 
Congestive Heart Failure 0.162 0.263 1.18 0.70 – 1.96 0.538 
Cirrhosis 1.338 0.488 3.82 1.46 – 9.93 0.006 
HIV Infection 1.489 0.691 4.43 1.14 – 17.16 0.031 
Tracheostomy 0.396 0.442 1.49 0.63 – 3.53 0.369 
Central Venous Catheter Days 0.026 0.012 1.03 1.00 – 1.05 0.027 
Major OR Therapeutic Procedure -0.443 0.224 0.64 0.41 – 1.00 0.048 
ICU Days 0.023 0.012 1.02 1.00 – 1.05 0.054 




Table 6.3.7. Multivariable Analysis of Risk Factors for MRSA BSI vs. Non-Infected Controls 
Using Catheter Days (Including Antibiotic Use) 
 β S.E. OR 95% CI P-value 
Male Gender 0.461 0.271 1.59 0.93 – 2.70 0.089 
Stay in Skilled Nursing Facility 0.206 0.869 1.23 0.22 – 6.75 0.813 
Hospitalization in the Prior Year 0.364 0.288 1.44 0.82 – 2.53 0.206 
Charlson Severity of Illness Measure 0.021 0.085 1.02 0.86 – 1.22 0.804 
Malignancy 0.363 0.439 1.44 0.61 – 3.40 0.409 
Renal Failure 0.988 0.345 2.69 1.37 – 5.28 0.004 
Congestive Heart Failure -0.199 0.345 0.82 0.42 – 1.61 0.565 
Cirrhosis 1.268 0.559 3.55 1.19 – 10.63 0.023 
HIV Infection 1.212 0.882 3.56 0.60 – 18.91 0.169 
Tracheostomy 0.857 0.838 3.36 0.46 – 12.18 0.306 
Central Venous Catheter Days 0.033 0.018 1.03 1.00 – 1.07 0.066 
Major OR Therapeutic Procedure -0.594 0.304 0.52 0.30 – 1.00 0.050 
ICU Days -0.020 0.025 0.98 0.93 – 1.03 0.431 
Immunosuppressive Medication -0.100 0.287 1.11 0.63 – 1.94 0.728 
Monobactam Use 1.975 1.258 7.20 0.62 – 84.85 0.117 
Quinolone Use 0.920 0.597 2.51 0.78 – 8.09 0.123 
This analysis used catheter days instead of dichotomous variable for catheter use.  
ICU = Intensive Care Unit, OR = Operating Room 
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